## APR 3 0 1991

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	UMITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	DISTRICT OF ALASKA			
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. A	90-015 CR		
4	,			
5	,	April 24, 1991		
6	British cold officer and	ck a.m.		
7	EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY, )  Defendants. )  IMPOSITION	OF SENTENCE		
8	Berendants.			
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE H. RUSSEL HOLLAND			
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
12		NA GO		
13	Il and the context			
14	I Dana and Nacuta	l Resources Div.		
15	[] collembyivani			
16	Washington, DC	P.O. Box 23985 Washington, DC 20026-3985		
17	\ <b>\</b>			
18	0.5. Department			
19	All Chorage, Ak 9			
20				
21	0.5. Department			
22	Environmental C			
23	$r.\theta$ . sox 23965			
24	Washington, DC (202) 272-9879	20026-3985		
25	;     · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	:		
		*		

ļ		
1	APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):	
2	For the Plaintiff	ERIC NAGLE
3	(Continued):	U.S. Department of Justice Land and Natural Resources Div.
4		Environmental Crimes Section 601 Pennsylvania Avenue
5		P.O. Box 23985 Washington, DC 20026-3985
6	non no Condon	(202) 272-9879
7	For Defendant Exxon Shipping:	JAMES F. NEAL Neal & Harwell
8 9		2000 One Nashville Place 150 Fourth Avenue, North Nashville, TN 37219 (615) 244-1713
10		JAMES SANDERS
11		Neal & Harwell 2000 One Nashville Place
12	^	150 Fourth Avenue, North Nashville, TN 37219
13		(615) 244-1713
14		ROBERT BUNDY Bogle & Gates 1031 West 4th Avenue, Suite 600
15 16		Anchorage, AK 99501 (907) 276-4557
17	For Defendant	EDWARD LYNCH
18	Exxon Corporation:	Association General Counsel Exxon Corporation
19		225 E. John W. Carpenter Freeway Irving, TX 75062-2298 (214) 444-1000
20		PATRICK LYNCH
21	•	O'Melveny & Myers 400 South Hope Street
22		Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 (213) 669-6000
23		JOHN CLOUGH
24		Clough & Associates 431 North Franklin, Suite 202
25		Juneau, AK 99801 (907) 586-5777

1	APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):				
2 3	Court Recorder:	LINDA CHRISTENSEN U.S. District Court 222 West 7th Avenue, #4			
4		Anchorage, AK 99513-7564 (907) 271-3163			
5	Transcription Service:	EXECUTARY			
6		626 Cordova, Suite 104 Anchorage, AK 99501	Anchorage, AK 99501 (907) 272-4084		
7					
8	Proceedings recorded by electric produced by transcription seems.	ctronic sound recording. Transcrervice.	ipt		
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24			. •		
25		•			

## .

be seated.

(On record at 8:37 o'clock a.m.)

## ANCHORAGE, ALASKA - WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 1991

THE CLERK: All rise. His Honor the Court, the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska, is now

in session, the Honorable H. Russel Holland presiding. Please

(Pause)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We are taking up first this morning Case A90-015 Criminal, <u>United States of America v. Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company</u>. The matter is set down for imposition of sentence. We have a necessary preliminary to that, which is the question of whether or not I should accept the plea agreement which was negotiated between the Government and the defendants.

In connection with making that decision, I have, of course, reviewed the sentencing memoranda that have been submitted by counsel. I have received from counsel subsequently summaries of reports of various environmental assessments of the damage which flowed from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, and I have considered those reports. I have received a considerable number of public comments pursuant to notice which we gave indicating that we would accept and consider public comment on this sentencing in lieu of a Probation Service report. As has, I think, been reported,

those comments ran rather heavily against the settlement agreement for a whole variety of reasons.

Finally, I have received a number of communications from the legislature of the State of Alaska and, in particular, a Special House Committee which is considering the civil settlement which has also been negotiated between these same parties. That Committee had requested, at the time we took the changes of plea, that we postpone decision on this matter as far as sentencing until after the Committee had had an opportunity to complete its work.

Subsequently, the Committee chair, I believe, indicated to me that he expected that the Committee would have completed its work by today and — or yesterday, at any rate, and would have some input to me by yesterday, which I indicated was quite acceptable. Unfortunately, I heard again from the Committee yesterday, as was reported this morning, indicating that the Committee had not yet reached a decision and again asking that I delay this proceeding. With respect to that request, and while I have given it serious consideration, the fact is I have reached a decision on the acceptability of the plea agreement, and I am not, at this time, persuaded that there is any reason why I should delay or defer announcing that decision.

With respect to the plea agreement, I am satisfied that the parties worked very hard, that they worked in complete

good faith, and that they came up with an agreement which they believed to be good and acceptable and one that they could justify to the Court. In evaluating that agreement, I have indicated -- I had indicated early on to counsel that while there were no applicable Federal Sentencing Commission guidelines for use in sentencing corporations, that I would look to the general sentencing factors set out in federal law with respect to sentencing in general and organizations in particular in evaluating the plea agreement which had been entered into here.

I am satisfied that the pleas which were offered and reflected in the agreement adequately reflect the seriousness of the underlying conduct. That is not a problem with the agreement. In that regard, and if you will excuse just a little bit of editorializing on my part, I have some difficulty with the concept that we criminalize unintentional environmental accidents, in effect criminalizing the killing of birds and sea otter and so forth, yet we do not criminalize airline crashes which result from negligence and which kill people. Congress, in the sentencing guidelines, has told us—the Courts—that we must do better in avoiding disparity in sentencing. I suggest that Congress has some work of its own to do in getting the disparity out of the criminal laws, for, as I see it, we are affording greater protection to birds and sea otter, that aren't even good for food, than we are people.

I think that's some pretty serious disparity.

However, my job is to enforce the law as it is on the books at the present time, and I mean to do that. The sentencing factors that I alluded to earlier include such things as the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the offense, whether the penalties to be imposed adequately deter others from similar conduct. I'm to seek to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. I'm to consider restitution. With respect to fines and corporate defendants, I am to consider the defendants' income and earning capacity and financial resources. In short, I'm to consider the size of the defendant organization.

I've used those factors in evaluating this plea agreement. I have come to the conclusion that the fines which the agreement proposes to be imposed do not adequately achieve deterrence. I am afraid that this fine sends the wrong message, suggesting that spills are a cost of business which can be absorbed. The fines, I think, are also inadequate if, as the law requires at the present time, defendants who commit environmental crimes are to be punished. The fine proposed to me does not appear to me to adequately punish the defendants for the conduct to which guilty pleas were offered.

There has been a great deal said in the comments which I received about the unavailability of scientific data.

In that regard, it is, of course, quite probable that there is more scientific data available to some of us than there is to the general public. But having said that, I would further observe that the availability of scientific data does not, I think, at this time, stand in the way of making the decision which needs to be made here. Much information is available. There is no question but what the Exxon Valdez oil spill was off the chart as far as other environmental disasters that we've had in this country. It was very large, to say the least. The damage, although we cannot presently quantify it with specificity, was very great, sufficiently so that I feel very comfortable saying that the fines which were proposed to me were simply not adequate.

One final matter which has been the subject of some controversy and which, in my view, should be — simply not be a factor in connection with this case has to do with the role of Alyeska in these proceedings, and it is my perception that Alyeska has no role whatsoever in these proceedings. A certain Congressman has written me on the subject. It's interesting to note that his communication to me appeared in the press a day and a half before I read about it in the newspaper, and it appears to me that he was more interested in getting some publicity than he was in informing me. Be that as it may, I do not have any role in the decision of whether Alyeska should or should not be prosecuted for anything. That's an executive

decision; it's a Justice Department decision. I take no position on it; I have no role on it. I take no responsibility for the decision that is to be made, and I do not think that is an appropriate provision for a plea agreement in connection with this case.

As is obvious from my comments, the plea agreement is rejected.

Mr. Neal, Mr. Lynch, at this point, the defendants are entitled to withdraw their pleas of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement if they wish to. Are you gentlemen ready to make that decision now, or do you require some time to consider the matter?

MR. NEAL: May it please the Court, James Neal representing Exxon Shipping. This is a matter that we need some time to consider, and we would ask for some time to reflect on what the Court said and consider our course with the Court's (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Thirty days?

MR. NEAL: Thirty days would be adequate, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEAL: Thank you.

THE COURT: If a decision is made earlier than that,

I would appreciate your letting me know about it. We'll look

for an answer no later than Friday, the 24th of May. As I say,

I have some interest in moving this matter along as quickly as

it can and should be, but I realize that this is a decision that's going to take some thinking on your part. Thirty days, May 24. If you have a decision earlier, I will appreciate it.

Will that be sufficient for Exxon Corporation also?

MR. LYNCH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The same will apply to Exxon Corporation. I'll expect a decision as soon as possible and no later than the 24th of May. Upon receiving your decision, I'll do one of two things. We'll -- we will -- well, we'll schedule a status conference of some sort at that point to do whatever needs to be done in light of the decision that you make. And we'll communicating with you a time and place for that meeting.

Anything further we need to do, gentlemen?

MR. DeMONACO: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. We'll be in recess subject to call.

THE CLERK: Excuse me. This Court now stands in recess subject to call.

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the above-entitled matter were adjourned at 8:50 o'clock a.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Cindy S. Carl, CCR

4/27/91 Date