




MILITARY SUPPORT
FOR
CLEANUP
OF
THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL



Headquarters Alaskan Air Command
Office of History
1990

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MILITARY SUPPORT

for

CLEANUP

of

THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL

-- a special historical study --

by

William S. Hanable


**Headquarters Alaskan Air Command
Office of History
1990**

FOREWORD

President Bush's 6 April 1989 directive that the Department of Defense support cleanup of the largest and most complex oil spill in American history presented daily challenges. The response by members of every service -- Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps -- was outstanding through the end of initial cleanup operations in September 1989.

The Administration made the right decision by leaving the burden of cleanup with the spiller, Exxon, while providing special resources and skills available only from the military to help Exxon.

The spill taught us a lot. The activities that generated those lessons and the lessons themselves are outlined in this special historical study. They constitute an important historical record.



THOMAS G. McINERNEY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

FOREWORD

When the Alaskan Command was disestablished as a unified command on 1 July 1975, provisions were made that in the event of a disaster, Joint Task Force-Alaska would be activated to coordinate military assistance to civil authorities. Although there was no declaration of a disaster following the 11-million-gallon Exxon Valdez oil spill requiring the activation of the JTF-AK, an Alaska Oil Spill Task Force was formed at the direction of President Bush under Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney to coordinate military support for oil spill cleanup. In essence it functioned very much like JTF-AK would have.

This report was prepared at the direction of Lt Gen Thomas McInerney, Commander, Alaskan Air Command and Defense Senior Representative for oil spill cleanup. He wanted a historical study prepared and all important documents collected and retained for future use. The report focuses on task force activities and how it managed the military's response to the oil spill cleanup effort.

The report was researched and written by Dr William S. Hanable, and is based on an analysis of the large number of documents that were produced and interviews with key participants, including Senator Ted Stevens and General McInerney. Everyone was extremely cooperative and willing provided documentation and information.

The response to the oil spill proved that within a proper framework, an organization organized, trained and equipped for a war fighting mission, can quickly and effectively use its resources to support the civil sector in a time of need.



John Hanable Cloe
Command Historian
Alaskan Air Command

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Twelve days after the Tanker Vessel Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and spilled 11 million gallons of oil, President Bush directed the Department of Defense to assist in cleanup of the oil. Coast Guard Commandant Paul A. Yost was placed in charge of the cleanup effort. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Clyde E. Robbins was designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. was designated as Executive Agent for Department of Defense cleanup assistance. Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF, Commander, Alaskan Air Command, was designated Defense Senior Representative in Alaska, to coordinate military support for the cleanup. Alaska Oil Spill Joint Task Force was established as staff to Gen McInerney. Funding arrangements provided for recovery of approved costs from the "311K" Fund established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.

Critical questions arose as to the type of military support to be provided. A Washington suggestion that troops be sent to the oil-soaked beaches to assist with cleanup was successfully opposed by Defense Department officials and Gen McInerney. Instead, the military provided airlift, command and control, communications, equipment, landing craft for ship-to-shore transportation and in-shore operations, medical support, oil skimmers, and ships for berthing civilian workers.

Over 1,000 military personnel were active in cleanup support activities. Air Force airlift moved over 1,000 tons of cargo. Alaskan Air Command modified its automated command and control system to provide an Oil Spill Computer Automated Response (OSCAR) resource-tracking and communications system. Army Corps of Engineers dredges proved to be the most successful means for recovering floating oil. Army and Marine helicopters provided medical evacuation support. Six Navy amphibious assault ships rotated to provide berthing for hundreds of civilian cleanup workers and Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Navy landing craft transported the workers from the ships to the beaches.

The spill response tested existing plans for military assistance in civil emergencies and sharpened inter-service cooperative techniques. Overall, military support for oil spill cleanup was beneficial but costly.

Acknowledgements


I am deeply indebted to the many people who took the time to help me with this history. Foremost among them is my boss, John Haile Cloe, who patiently guided me through the process of preparing my first historical study for the Air Force. Equally helpful were Senator Stevens; Gen McInerney, and key members of his staff such as Cols Tom Wilson and Mort Plumb, Cdr John Tobia, and Majs Billy Lashlee and Gary Russey; and Col William W. Kakel, Commander of the Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, all of whom took time from their busy schedules to share their thoughts and to review a draft manuscript.

In addition to those who contributed by sharing their direct experience and knowledge, others helped in tracking down facts and photographs. BM2 Robert Travis, Coast Guard historian, and Lt Mike Crickard, Coast Guard Public Affairs Officer, of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator's staff provided valuable assistance in tracking down facts and photographs. SSgt Kevin Bishop of Detachment 5, 1369th Audio Visual Squadron also helped with photographs, as did John Killoran, Public Affairs Officers for the Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

wsh



CG-130
Overflight from Kodiak
April 7
0900-1300



EXXON VALDEZ SPILL

Chapter I

BACKGROUND

Nature, Purpose, and Scope

This special study provides historical perspective on the employment of Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) to manage the armed forces' response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Limitations

This narrative addresses activities of all armed forces units under the control of JTF-AK. There is also information about activities of the Alaska Air and Army National Guard, although President Bush did not federalize either for spill response. It does not include operations of the U.S. Coast Guard operating as a service of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

Historical Perspective

Alaska's remoteness, geographic vastness, and small population have created many opportunities for military assistance with civil affairs. These began with arrangements for transfer of Alaska from Russian to American jurisdiction.

Military Assistance in Civil Affairs Through the End of World War II

Russia transferred its interests in Alaska to the United States in 1867. After the transfer, the United States Army administered the new territory from 1867 to 1877. Then the Navy governed Alaska from 1879 to 1884. Both services conducted major geographic and scientific explorations in these years.

Late in the 19th century the Army imposed order on turbulent gold rush camps and rushed food to supposedly starving gold seekers. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Army and Navy constructed the foundations of Alaska's current telecommunication system. Army officers then oversaw construction of a vast network of overland trails and The Alaska Railroad. The Navy

patrolled offshore waters to prevent fish trap piracy. It also conducted aerial photography and ship surveys for mapping in Southeast Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and supported development of coal mines in Southcentral Alaska.¹

The World War II era saw construction of scores of military bases. The war also brought expansion of Alaska's road and airfield network, communications facilities, ports, and pipelines to accommodate military needs.²

Post-World War II Military Assistance in Civil Affairs

In the post-war era, federal expansion of Alaska's infrastructure continued to accommodate military contingencies while the military helped civil authorities in civil emergencies and natural disasters. Such assistance included continuing help with Search and Rescue incidents by Air Force, Army, and Navy units. Most notable, however, was massive aid furnished following the 24 March 1964 earthquake in Southcentral Alaska. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Alaskan Command directed joint service efforts that provided airlift, communications, engineering, medical, search and rescue, and security assistance. The military provided similar relief in suppressing forest fires in 1966 and in the wake of a disastrous flood in Fairbanks during the

¹ Hanable, William S. and Vincent Ponko Jr., The Navy in Alaska, 1867-1941: an historic resource study (Anchorage: The Institute for Public History, 1983); United States Army Alaska [USARAL], The Army's Role in the Building of Alaska, USARAL Pamphlet 360-5, 1 April 1969.

² Dod, Karl C , The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, United States Army In World War II series (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), pp. 33-37, 276-339; Rpt (U), Public Information Office, Headquarters Alaskan Sea Frontier and Seventeenth Naval District, "A History of the Alaskan Sea Frontier and Seventeenth Naval District, 1946-1958," OPNAV Report 5720.5, 1 September 1959.

summer of 1967.³ With these precedents, it was natural for Alaskans to turn to the military for help when confronted with the largest oil spill in the history of North America. That spill took place as a result of the grounding of the supertanker Exxon Valdez.

Grounding of the Exxon Valdez

The Exxon Valdez, a two-year-old 987-foot-long tanker operated by the Exxon Corporation, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, at 0004 on 24 March 1989. The vessel carried over 53 million gallons of oil. The grounding ruptured eight of the ship's 11 cargo tanks. Eleven million gallons of oil spilled from these⁴ tanks into the ocean within five hours of the grounding.


Prince William Sound, where the spill occurred, is the northernmost embayment of the Pacific Ocean. Over 1,500 nautical miles (NM) northwest of Seattle, the sound stretches east to west from Point Whitt to Cape Puget, a distance of 150 NM. It extends about 100 NM north to south, from Hinchinbrook Entrance to College Fjord.

The sound is a rich marine environment, with large populations of marine mammals, sea birds, fish, and inter-tidal creatures. Because of this, it is the location of intense commercial fishery and heavy recreational use. Offshoots of a northward flowing counter-clockwise ocean current, known as the Alaska Coastal Current, flush through the sound. They enter its eastern channels and spill back into the ocean near Cape Junken at the western edge of the sound. From there, the current runs southwest along Alaska's coastline, which

³ Rpt (U), Headquarters, Alaskan Command, "Operating Helping Hand: The Armed Forces React to Earthquake Disaster," undated; Rpt (U), Alaskan Air Command, "Highlights of History, Alaskan Air Command and Its Predecessors," undated.

⁴ Rpt (U), National Response Team, "The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, A Report to the President from Samuel K. Skinner, Secretary, Department of Transportation and William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency," May 1989, p. 3.

is also heavily used by marine and terrestrial plants and animals.⁵



Alaska's Gulf Coast and Prince William Sound

⁵ Alaska Geographic Society, Where the Mountains Meet the Sea, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1986), p. 5.

The North Slope crude oil spreading into the pristine environment was deadly. It also was transforming itself into an increased volume of toxic matter. A typical crude oil has a density of about 0.85. This fact, combined with winds, wave action, and currents spread the oil rapidly. As a result, some toxins were removed. After about 24 hours, an emulsification of oil and seawater led to formation of a highly viscous material containing about 70 percent seawater. This poison stuck to anything it touched, including birds and sea otters.⁶

Rapid containment and retrieval of spilled oil is the only effective method for cleanup. But within hours of the spill it became clear that the oil industry was not prepared to quickly contain and retrieve the oil. The sheer magnitude of the spill would have made cleanup difficult in any case. Industry cost-cutting further compounded the problem. Equipment shortages, equipment under repair, and untrained personnel allowed time to pass as the oil flowed away from the immediate vicinity of the ship. Industry plans called for a containment barge to be based at Valdez, the nearest port to the spill site. The plans said the barge would be on-scene within five hours. When the spill did occur, the barge left for the spill only 10 hours after the grounding and arrived on-scene two hours later. By 0730, the spill was four miles long and 1,000 feet wide. By the end of March the spilled oil had spread over 1,000 miles of Prince William Sound, affecting 350 miles of beach. Its leading edge was pushing out of the sound into the southwest-flowing Alaska Coastal Current where it began to contaminate several hundred more miles of coastline.


Newspapers and television programs saturated the public with pictures of oil-covered sea otters, petroleum-soaked dead birds, and beaches awash in oil. The pictures combined with reports of the oil industry's inability to stem the flood of oil to create a national sense of public outrage. The Coast Guard, designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan for

⁶ Science, "Oil Spills," 244, May, 12 May 89, p. 4905.

⁷ National Response Team, May 1989, p. 12; Map, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Exxon Valdez," 1 Apr 1989.

on-water spill response, had been on site within one hour after the spill.⁸

Despite the Coast Guard's rapid reaction and expertise in dealing with pollution situations, public and politicians demanded a more dramatic federal response. As a result, on 6 April 1989, President Bush directed the Department of Defense to provide whatever aid necessary to cleanup the spill. JTF-AK became one of the principal facilitators of that assistance.



The Exxon Valdez, after the spill. (USCG Photo)

⁸ 40 CFR 300.

Mission of JTF-AK

JTF-AK came into being in 1975 as a result of the disestablishment of the Alaskan Command, which had formerly overseen the activities of all military forces in Alaska. Concurrent with that disestablishment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided for a joint task force that could be activated under the command of Commander, Alaskan Air Command (AAC). The task force's role was to coordinate response in the event of hostilities, natural disasters, or emergencies.⁹ Although exercised regularly, JTF-AK had not been mobilized for real-world events prior to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill of 24 March 1989.


Plan for JTF Mobilization

JTF-AK Operations Plan (OPLAN) 9639-83, dated 1 October 1983, is titled and addresses Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Although outdated, its policies, procedures, and prescribed requirements proved useful guides during the Alaskan Oil Spill Cleanup.

There were two major differences in what OPLAN 9639-83 anticipated and what happened. First, the plan anticipated a situation in which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would be in charge. The Alaskan Oil Spill, as an on-water incident, drew the Coast Guard in as Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The FOSC was initially the Coast Guard Commander Steve McCall, Marine Safety Officer at Valdez. Then Rear Admiral Edward Nelson Jr., Commandant of the 17th Coast Guard District, followed McCall. After 19 April, Vice Admiral Clyde E. Robbins, commander of the Coast Guard's Pacific Area, served as FOSC. In a second difference, the plan anticipated a situation in which JTF-AK would be activated. JTF-AK was not activated. This would have inappropriately involved the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a civil emergency. Instead, Secretary of Defense Cheney established a special Alaska Oil Spill Task Force (AOS-TF). In practice, this meant that the same personnel who staffed JTF-Alaska staffed the task force dealing with the oil spill. The Oil Spill Task Force, however, reported to the Department of the Army's

⁹ Hist (S/Decl 31 December 2005), Alaskan Air Command, 1 Jul 74-30 Jun 75, p. 32, info used is unclassified.

Directorate of Military Support rather than to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰



Military Organization for Oil Spill Clean Up Support

¹⁰ Intvw, Hanable w/Maj Billy Eugene Lashlee, USA, Joint Operations and Training, JTF-AK, 26 Jan 90, SD 001; Intvw, Hanable w/Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF, Commander, Alaskan Air Command, 5 March 1990, SD 002. The Alaska Oil Spill Task Force (AOS-TF) was occasionally referred to as the Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup Task Force (AOSC-TF).

Organization of JTF-AK

When President Bush directed military assistance for the Exxon Valdez oil spill response, JTF-AK was in the process of transition. Staffed by a permanent cell of six, with other billets filled on a shadow basis by AAC and 6th Infantry Division (Light) (6th LID) personnel, the JTF was in the process of losing all but its natural disaster¹¹ function to the newly-authorized Alaskan Command.

Key personnel on the Task Force, including those dual-hatted, and permanent cell personnel at the time of the spill are shown in Tables I-1 and I-2.

Key Personnel - JTF-AK

Position	<u>Name</u>
Commander	Lt Gen Thomas G McInerney, USAF
Deputy Commander	Col Thomas A. Wilson II, USA
Personnel, J-1	Col Bruce O Creller, USAF
Intelligence, J-2	Col William L. Cogley, USAF
Operations, J-3	Col Morton V. Plumb Jr., USAF
Logistics, J-4	Col Eric L. Redifer, USAF
Plans, J-5	Col Neil R McCoy, USAF
Communications- Electronics, J-6	Col Harvey L. Dent, USAF

Table I-1¹²

¹¹ Hist (S/Declas OADR), Alaskan Air Command/Alaskan NORAD Region/Joint Task Force-Alaska [AAC/ANR/JTF-AK]. January-December 1985, Vol. I, p. 30; Hist (S/Declas OADR), AAC/ANR/JTF-AK, January-December 1988, p. 30, info used is unclassified.

¹² Hist (S/Declas OADR), AAC/ANR/JTF-AK, January-December 1988, p. 370, info used is unclassified.

Permanent Cell - JTF-AK

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Deputy Chief of Staff	Lt Col H.W. "Bud" Cummings, USAF
Director of Joint Operations	Col Morton V. Plumb Jr., USAF
Chief, Joint Exercise Plans	Lt Col Roger A. Ayres, USAF
Chief, Joint Operations and Training	Maj Billy E. Lashlee, USA
Secretary	Debra S. Davis, Civ
Chief, Joint Operations Administration	TSgt William Greene III, USAF

Table I-2¹³

Political events led JTF-AK, which had not been activated except for exercises since its formation in 1975, to become involved in the Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup (AOSC).

¹³ (U) "Alaskan Air Command Staff Directory," April 1989.

Chapter II

PRESIDENT BUSH DIRECTS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Political Considerations

Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) toured Prince William Sound and the Alaska coastline southwest of the sound during the last week of March. Maj Gen John C. Schaeffer, Adjutant General of the Alaska National Guard, accompanied Stevens. On his return to Washington, Sen. Stevens arranged an appointment with President Bush for himself, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), and Congressman Don Young (R-AK). The three Alaskan legislators pressed the leader of their party¹⁴ for federal assistance in dealing with the oil spill.

Military Capabilities

At the time President Bush directed military assistance for the oil spill clean up, some DOD assets had already been deployed to help in the clean up work.

Alaska Air and Army National Guard units were among the first military entities to respond to the oil spill. Because they were not federalized, they did so as state forces. The State Adjutant General, Maj Gen John W. Schaeffer, Alaska Army National Guard (AKARNG), made a reconnaissance trip to assess the situation on 25 March. He designated Lt Col Willard H. Masker, AKARNG, as the officer in charge of coordinating support efforts. At the peak of state military involvement, approximately 125 people from Air and Army Guard units and the Alaska Naval Militia were involved in spill response.¹⁵

As a result of Gen Schaeffer's assessment, the Alaska National Guard focused its spill response efforts at Valdez. It also sent representatives to emergency operations centers in Seward and Kodiak. On 28 March,

¹⁴ Senator Ted Stevens, 5 Jan 90, interview with William S. Hanable, SD 003; Newsletter, Senator Ted Stevens, Apr 89, SD 004.


¹⁵ Memo, Beans, Joseph P., Deputy Commissioner, Dept of Mil and Veterans Affairs, State of Alaska, "Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Summary Report," 6 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "After Action Report," undated, SD 005.

Guard units had established an Air Coordination and Control Center at Valdez. By this time, the usual rate of 8 to 10 arrivals and departures at the Valdez airport had risen to 100 per day. By 4 April, the rate had risen to 250 per day. In addition to a coordination center, the Guard also sent an Aerial Port Team to onload/offload civilian and military aircraft. The Guard also dispatched refueling equipment and personnel, and firefighting equipment and personnel to Valdez. The Army Guard began to provide airlift with its helicopters and small fixed-wing aircraft while the Air Guard began to move spill response equipment with its C-130s (Hercules) transports. The Guard also sent tactical satellite radios with Air Guard operators to facilitate communications to remote areas in Prince William Sound. In addition, Guard teams provided public affairs support to the state's disaster response agency, the Alaska Division of Emergency Services. As regular military forces became more involved in spill response, Guard activities decreased.¹⁶


The U.S. Navy also became involved prior to 6 April. Naval Sea Systems Command, under pre-existing agreements, had begun support operations on 25 March. Two Navy Marco Class V skimmers were airlifted from Travis AFB to Elmendorf AFB on 26 March. Five additional skimmers and supplies of boom went to Alaska from West Coast stocks at the beginning of April. By 10 April the Navy had 94 contractor personnel conducting clean up operations under the supervision of a GS-14 civilian employee. Ultimately 22 Navy skimmers worked the Alaskan oil spill. Navy salvage experts also came to Alaska. The Pacific Fleet Salvage Officer arrived in Anchorage on 10 April and salvage experts from the Naval Sea Systems Command followed. With the skimmers came rigid hull and inflatable towing boats, hydraulically-powered submersible pumps, fenders, and a support system of shop, rigging, command, and communications vans.¹⁷

¹⁶ Beans, 6 Oct 89.

¹⁷ Memo, Chief of Naval Operations to Department of the Navy, "Navy Participation in Alaska Oil Cleanup," 10 Apr 89, in Memo, Dept of the Army, Office of the Secretary, "Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup Support -- Information Memorandum Number 5," 18 Apr 89 (hereafter cited as DOMS 005, etc.), SD 006; DOMS-014, 26 Apr 89. Note: all DOMS Information Memos are in Source Document 006.



A Military Airlift Command C-5 delivers oil spill cleanup cargo to Elmendorf Air Force Base for trucking to the coast. (USAF Photo)



A U.S. Navy skimmer offloads collected oil to a barge via a vacuum truck. (USAF Photo, April 1989)

Alternatives Considered

As a result of the visit by the Alaskan Congressional delegation and a public outcry about the allegedly apathetic federal response to the disaster, President Bush directed Gov. John H. Sununu, his chief of staff, to solve the problem. Gov. Sununu assigned the responsibility to Richard Breeden, Assistant to the President for Issue Analysis. By 0940, Washington time, on 6 April, Breeden had recommended that the U.S. Navy, primarily SEABEE's, provide and prepare floating facilities for logistics, equipment storage, communications, and dormitory service. The U.S. Air Force, thought Breeden, should provide airlift and personnel for clean up. The U.S. Army, he said, should provide 1500 troops for on-the-ground clean up duty. The President, he recommended, should announce that he was directing the Secretary of Defense to make equipment, facilities, and personnel available to assist in the clean up. Breeden presented his plan to Gov. Sununu, who told him to call the Defense Department "to be sure DOD was on board."¹⁸

Some of Breeden's recommendations contradicted what others thought about appropriate military involvement in spill response. The military itself believed putting troops on the beach would be costly and inappropriate. Civilian bureaucracies were concerned that masses of troops working in remote areas would add to, not ameliorate, oil-imposed injuries. Congressional figures such as Stevens, Murkowski, and Young and some Alaskans didn't want troops to cancel out employment and contract opportunities that clean up efforts might present for Alaskans. Despite this opposition, the idea of putting troops on the beach continued to come up and each time was squelched. Rumors abounded, prophesying that up to ¹⁹ 5,000 soldiers might be put to work wiping oiled rocks.

Without accepting the details of Breeden's plan, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney agreed that the

¹⁸ Memo, Addington, David S., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense, "White House Plan for DOD Participation in Alaska Oil Cleanup," 6 Apr 89, in DOMS 001, 6 Apr 89.

¹⁹ Stevens, 5 Jan 90; Intvw, Hanable w/Col Thomas A. Wilson II, USA, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, JTF-AK, 23 Jan 90, SD 007; Intvw, Hanable w/Col William W. Kakel, USA, District Engineer, Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 13 Feb 90, SD 008.

Department of Defense should support oil spill clean up. He directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. to serve as the department's focal point for oil spill response. This was in keeping with standing doctrine that the Department of the Army is the military's Executive Agent for disaster support. At 1330 on 6 April 1989, the Army activated its Directorate of Military Support Task Force (DOMS-TF) in the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon. Maj Gen James D. Smith, USA, directed the task force, which was to coordinate DOD oil spill response at the national level.²⁰

The DOMS-TF met with Coast Guard staff in Washington on 6 April. The Coast Guard envisioned DOD assistance as including berthing vessels, helicopter and small boat transportation within the operations area, and short and long distance communications. During the discussion, participants noted that if troops did clean up work, they would ruin one uniform a day and that armed personnel would be needed, with each working party to stand watch as bear guards.²¹

Also on 6 April, Secretary Cheney designated Lt Gen McInerney as the Department of Defense Senior Representative [in Alaska] and Commander, Alaska Oil Spill Joint Task Force (AOS-TF or AOSC-TF). The task force was to coordinate DOD oil spill response in the Alaskan theater. Thus Adm Robbins, as FOSC, was in charge of the total oil spill response and Gen McInerney was in charge of DOD support for oil spill response. Although clear after-the-fact, at the time this arrangement caused some confusion. This was especially true among those who after 6 April assumed that President Bush had placed the military in charge of oil spill response. Gen McInerney decided to have JTF-AK function as the Alaska Oil Spill Task Force, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had purposely not activated JTF-AK itself.²²

There were two reasons for this. First, the Joint Chiefs did not need to be involved in response to a civil emergency. The existing DOMS structure was a more appropriate chain of command. In any event, the Joint

²⁰ DOMS 001, 6 Apr 89.

²¹ DOMS 001, 6 Apr 89.

²² Lashlee, 26 Jan 90; Wilson, 23 Jan 90.

Chiefs were also busy with military emergencies in foreign areas such as Panama.²³

Second, everyone knew that oil spill assistance would be costly. Some costs would be reimbursed by Exxon, the spiller, and some would not. If JTF-AK was activated by the JCS, non-reimbursed costs would be charged to JCS. If JTF-AK was not activated, non-reimbursed costs might be charged to AAC's already scarce operations and maintenance funds.²⁴

Funding

Funding arrangements were quite different from normal military procedures. In peacetime, the military uses budgeted funds. In a national security emergency, the military relies on after-the-fact appropriated funds. In the instance of the oil spill response, the military was to be reimbursed by the offending party. Exxon was to make contributions to the "311K" (referring to a section of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) fund. From these contributions, the FOSC would reimburse responding agencies for approved expenditures. This situation became complicated when Exxon indicated it would pay only for costs over and above normal operating costs. That is, Exxon would pay for a Reservist called to active duty for spill response, but not for a Regular whom the Department of Defense would have paid anyway. While Exxon intended to pay only for these "incremental costs," Department of Defense Comptroller Sean O'Keefe advised DOD agencies to bill for every cost relating to the oil spill. As a result, AAC later estimated its recoverable costs at \$28 million, versus a DOD estimate of \$54 million for total costs.²⁵

Besides funding considerations, JTF-AK was already in place. A known organization, it had components and

²³ McInerney, 5 Jan 90.

²⁴ Memo (U), Wilson, Col Thomas A. II, USA, Deputy Commander, JTF-AK, "Memorandum for Record," Subject: Summary of Actions/Information re DOD Response to Alaska Oil Spill, 7 April 1989, SD 009; Cloe, John H., Command Historian, AAC, Notes from 7 Apr 89 staff meeting.

²⁵ Anderson, Capt R.E., USCG, "Exxon Cost Recovery," 27 Apr 89, SD 010; Intvw, Hanable w/CMSGt Kenneth L. Moore, USAF, AAC, DCS/Comptroller, 3 Jan 90; Lashlee, 26 Jan 90.


staff on hand. Use of JTF-AK for oil spill response would take advantage of the existing organizational structure, use existing addresses and phone numbers, and minimize confusion. Recently exercised in Brim Frost 89, JTF-AK was fresh in people's minds and had an existing plan, COMJTF 9639 that outlined procedures for military support in civilian emergencies. Using JTF-AK would also, said an AAC staff paper, eliminate the need to explain why JTF-AK was not used for one of its purported missions.²⁶

Arguments against using JTF-AK included the possibility of strengthening support for continuing JTF-AK's existence as a part of the about-to-be-formed Alaskan Command (ALCOM). There was also the DOD directive on military assistance to civil authorities and activation of JTF-AK. It specifically excluded oil spills as reason to activate JTF-AK. The talking paper ended its recitation of pros and cons for activating JTF-AK by stating that if the organization was referred to only as "JTF," most people would²⁷ not know if the reference was to JTF-AK or AOS-JTF.

In the end, the JCS did not change their position. JTF-AK did not mobilize. Gen McInerney did use the JTF-AK staff to constitute the Alaska Oil Spill Task Force staff. Consequently, the JTF-AK name was used in most oil spill actions taken by the staff. Those staff actions are an important element of the history of military support for the Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup.

²⁶ Point Paper, AAC/DCSP, "Point Paper on Activation of JTF-AK, 7 Apr 89, SD 011.

²⁷ Point Paper, 7 Apr 89.



Col Thomas A. Wilson, USA, Deputy Commander, JTF-AK, and Col Robert D. Clark, USAF, Vice Commander, AAC, talk about computer tracking of oil spill cleanup resources. Alaskan Air Command's "OSCAR " system helped managers to control ships and cleanup workers. (Photo by Bill Roth, courtesy of Anchorage Daily News)

Chapter III

STAFF OPERATIONS

Planning

Maj Gen Smith alerted Gen McInerney by telephone on the evening of 5 April that the military might be called in to support oil spill response. The next morning, the AAC commander saw President Bush on the 0630 news announcing that he (Gen McInerney) would be in charge of military support operations in Alaska.²⁸

Gen McInerney made a personal visit to Prince William Sound within three hours of the President's announcement that the military would support oil spill clean up. On arriving at Valdez, the general and his staff found an atmosphere of hysteria. National news teams immediately shoved microphones and cameras into the general's face. The Coast Guard's National Strike Team and Navy skimmers were on-scene, and Exxon seemed not to want additional federal help. It was²⁹ clear that command and control was the biggest problem.

As a result his first trip to the scene of the oil spill, Gen McInerney made several recommendations to Washington officials. First, they should be prepared for an extended operation lasting until the Alaskan winter set in. Second, they should consider using troops only as a last resort, after all available local residents had been hired for clean up work. Third, they should know that early deployment of medical evacuation (medevac) assets might be desirable. Fourth, they should task the Navy to provide representatives with salvage and oil spill expertise to the DOMS Task Force Assessment Team. As a result of his investigations, Gen McInerney concluded that it was important that responsibility for cleanup remain with Exxon. The Department of Defense could help³⁰ Its strengths could reinforce the weaknesses of Exxon.

After his first visit to Prince William Sound, Gen McInerney then detailed several of his staff officers

²⁸ McInerney, 5 Jan 90.

²⁹ Kakel, 13 Feb 90.

³⁰ McInerney, 5 Jan 90.

to serve on the DOD assessment team. Col Wilson chaired the team. Table III-1 lists the members of the team.³¹

DOD ASSESSMENT TEAM

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Agency</u>
Col Tom Wilson	Team Chief	JTF-AK
Col Mort Plumb	Operations	JTF-AK
LTC Don Willhouse		DOMS-TF
LTC Richard Lasher	Logistics	JTF-AK
CPT John McAleenan	Communications	JTF-AK
CDR John Tobia	CINCPAC LNO	JTF-AK
John Elmore	Team Chief	Hq USACE
Bob Hopman	Dredging	Portland USACE
Bill Doran	Contracting	USACE
Jim Reese	Environmental	USACE
Paul Zepernick	Operations	USACE
LTC Roy Carlson		AK USACE
Guy McConnell		AK USACE
Tom Carter		AK USACE
Maj Paul Buteau	Surgeon Gen	Hq DA
LTC Morin	Industrial Hygienist	USA Health Svcs Command
LCDR Glenn Wiltshire		USCG

Table III-1³²

Additionally, Gen McInerney detailed three officers and two enlisted personnel to the Coast Guard operation in Valdez. This team was in-place on 8 April 1989 providing logistics, airlift, public relations, and OSCAR support to the FOSC and the Exxon logistics operations center. Table III-2 lists members of the JTF-deployed team.

JTF-DEPLOYED TEAM

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Office</u>
Lt Col Robert K. Stanberry	JTF Liaison to FOSC	JTF-AK
Capt Monica M. Aloisio	JTF Pub Relations	AAC/PA
Capt Greg T. Hellesto	JTF Logistics	AAC/LGX
MSgt Steven E. Patterson	JTF Transportation	AAC/LGT
MSgt William H. Reavis	OSCAR Installation	AAC/CVR

Table III-2

³¹ News Release, Hq AAC/PA, "JTF Winds Down Oil Spill Activity Response," AAC Release 89-9-3, 20 Sep 89; DOMS 002, 10 Apr 89.

³² DOMS 002, 10 Apr 89.

While the DOD Assessment Team worked and the JTF-Deployed Team established the DOD presence in Valdez, JTF-AK set up a Crisis Action Team (CAT) at Elmendorf to monitor events. The CAT presented daily briefings and situation reports, and processed requests from the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for Department of Defense support. The CAT would also control the Blackhawk helicopters that were to be deployed to Seward.³³

Initially, two CATs were organized. Beginning 6 April, the teams stood 12-hour shifts. Maj Billy E. Lashlee, USA, and Maj Gary R. Russey served as CAT Chiefs. Augmentees requested at the beginning of April were in place by 24 April. Then a third team was established. Twelve-hour shifts continued, but the third team allowed personnel to take time off. Prior to the third team, CAT personnel had worked without break.³⁴

In support of the CAT, the JTF Logistics Staff (J4) established a Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) under the control of Capt Karol A. Kolehmainen. The center's primary mission was to work all logistics-related actions. As the Department of Defense role during the early phase of the cleanup was primarily that of logistics, the LRC became a significant extension of the Crisis Action Team. The five member staff manned the LRC 18 to 20 hours per day, seven days a week, until relieved by augmentation personnel on 25 April 1989.³⁵

Orders for DOD resources had to be originated by the Coast Guard or Exxon, and approved by the FOSC. The requests could follow two routes. First, requests from Exxon in Valdez would be processed by the Exxon Chief of Logistics and then validated by the Coast Guard logistics representative. The requirement was passed to the deployed JTF logistics representative who would forward the request to the CAT. Likewise, requests from other government agencies operating in Valdez (Alaska Department of Emergency Services and Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation) directed their requests

³³ Intvw, Hanable w/Maj Gary R. Russey, USAF, 1 Feb 90, SD 012.

³⁴ Creller, Col Bruce O., USAF, Hq JTF-AK, DCS/Personnel, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," 4 Oct 89, Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated; Russey, 1 Feb 90.

³⁵ Hellesto, 3 Apr 89.

for support and information to the deployed JTF team. The second route involved requests from other agencies outside Valdez. These requests were forwarded directly to the CAT.³⁶

Orders at first came via telephone, then by facsimile, and finally by electronic mail. OSCAR (see below) became a critical part of CAT operations. It eventually included the CAT, Coast Guard offices in Valdez, Juneau, and Washington, D.C., and DOMS. Guided by Gen McInerney, JTF-AK took the attitude of getting what was needed to do the job. Requests that could not be satisfied from DOD assets in Alaska were referred to DOMS.³⁷

The DOD Assessment Team, augmented by JTF-AK specialists, left Elmendorf AFB at 0900, 10 April, by C-130, to survey areas affected by the oil spill. Coast Guard and Exxon officials at Valdez briefed the team. Then the members made an aerial reconnaissance of Prince William Sound. Afterward, team members met with their Coast Guard and Exxon counterparts at Valdez for individual discussions. Navy representatives followed on 11 April to discuss a request for berthing ships for clean up workers. The DOMS-TF Assessment Team also revisited Valdez on 11 and 12 April. The DOD Assessment Team determined where the Department of Defense might be of assistance in responding to the oil spill and to be sure that the FOSC was aware of such capabilities. By 13 April, the team had completed its on-site work and began to prepare a report for Mr. John W. Shannon, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics.³⁸

Even with military support gearing up, national authorities began to doubt that Exxon would be able to successfully manage the oil spill cleanup. This led National Command Authorities (NCA) on 24 April to direct

³⁶ Hellesto, 3 Apr 89.

³⁷ Lashlee, 26 Jan 90; Russey, 1 Feb 90.

³⁸ Memo, JTF-AK, Deputy Commander, to Hq AAC, Vice Commander, "DOMS-TF Assessment Survey," 9 Apr 89, SD 013; Situation Report (SITREP) 002 [hereafter JTF-AK 002, 003, etc.], JTF-AK, 10 Apr 89; JTF-AK 003, 11 Apr 89, JTF-AK 004, 13 Apr 89, SD 013; Wilson, 23 Jan 90. Note: all JTF-AK SITREPS cited hereafter are in SD 013.

Gen McInerney to prepare a detailed contingency plan. The plan was to provide for military takeover of oil spill clean up management, yet not relieve Exxon of financial responsibility. The general tasked his staff to provide annexes for such a plan by 0900 on 25 April. JTF-AK completed the plan on 28 April and sent it by Federal Express to NCA.³⁹

Command, Control, and Communications

Anticipating extensive naval involvement in clean up activities, Gen McInerney quickly asked that a naval flag officer be assigned as task force deputy commander. As a result, Rear Adm (LH) Edward B. Baker, Commander, Amphibious Group Three, San Diego, CA, was designated Deputy Commander, Alaska Oil Spill Task Force. Adm Baker arrived at Valdez on 24 April to assume his duties. Enroute he stopped at Elmendorf AFB for briefings. Gen McInerney also sent Lt Col Robert K. Stanberry, USA, U.S. Army Forces Command liaison officer to JTF-AK, Capt Greg T. Hellesto, AAC Chief of Logistics Plans, MSgt Steven E. Patterson, AAC Airlift Manager, and AAC Deputy Director of Public Affairs⁴⁰ Capt Monica M. Aloisio to be on-the-ground at Valdez.

In the meantime Coast Guard direction of oil spill clean up had been clarified. When he announced increased federal participation in the clean up, President Bush had placed Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul A. Yost in charge. Adm Yost immediately went to Alaska accompanied by Vice Adm Clyde E. Robbins. The admirals arrived in Alaska on 28 March. After initially establishing a command center at Elmendorf AFB, the admirals went on to Valdez. There, Adm Robbins assumed FOSC duties with Capt Rene Roussel delegated authority as Assistant FOSC Western Alaska⁴¹ for activities to the west of Prince William Sound.

On 14 April, Gen McInerney conducted a video conference with Secretary of the Army Marsh and DOMS officers. He provided them with his current assessment

³⁹ JTF-AK 014, 22 Apr 89; Cloe, John H., Command Historian, AAC, Notes from 24 Apr 89 staff meeting; JTF-AK 020, 28 Apr 89.

⁴⁰ DOMS 003, 11 Apr 89; DOMS 007, 14 Apr 89, DOMS 013, 25 Apr 89.

⁴¹ JTF-AK 002, 10 Apr 89; DOMS 009, 19 Apr 89.

of the clean up situation. He also spoke strongly against using troops for actual clean up work.⁴²

Besides the long distance coordination, a luncheon hosted by Adm Yost on 19 April at Elmendorf AFB provided face-to-face communication between the senior military officers and key civilians. Besides Adm Yost, Vice Adm Robbins, Gen McInerney, Rear Adm Baker, State Commissioner of Environmental Conservation Dennis Kelso, and mayors of several communities affected by the spill participated.⁴³

The following day, another political figure, Sen Murkowski also had personal contact with Gen McInerney. After talking with the general, Sen Murkowski suggested that the information presented be made available to the media. Then on 21 April, Gen McInerney briefed Sen Stevens on spill cleanup efforts.⁴⁴

A teleconference on 28 April followed the senatorial briefings. Secretary of the Army Marsh, Maj Gen Smith, Mr Breeden, Mr Addington, Rear Adm Sipes, Brig Gen Kelly and Brig Gen Shelton participated from DOMS. Lt Gen McInerney, Col Wilson, Col Clark, Col Plumb, Cdr Luchan, Capt Anderson, and Col Kakel participated from JTF-AK.⁴⁵

On 29 April, Gen McInerney, Col William W. Kakel, Alaska District Engineer for the Corps of Engineers, and Col Plumb flew to Valdez. There they joined Adm Robbins for a trip to the USS Juneau. After the ship visit Gen McInerney and his staff toured the Exxon operations center at Valdez.⁴⁶

Logistics

The orientation of Department of Defense oil spill response to logistics placed a significant burden on the small logistics staff at Alaskan Air Command. Joint Task Force-Alaska traditionally pulled its logistics cadre from AAC and depended entirely on augmentation for all

⁴² JTF-AK 006, 14 Apr 89.

⁴³ JTF-AK 011, 19 Apr 89.

⁴⁴ JTF-AK 011, 20 Apr 89; JTF-AK 013, 21 Apr 89.

⁴⁵ JTF-AK 020, 28 Apr 89.

⁴⁶ JTF-AK 021, 29 Apr 89.

logistics and engineering support. In response to tasking to support the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, Col Eric L Redifer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, established a Logistics Readiness Center and sent two people to Valdez for on-site liaison. The Logistics Readiness Center initiated logistics status reporting within Alaska, focusing on assets and materials that might be required for cleanup operations. Additionally, the LRC coordinated efforts to acquire and ship equipment and materials requisitioned by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and Exxon.⁴⁷

Staffing of the logistics center became a critical issue as the cleanup progressed. The five people in the Logistics Plans Division had to staff the LRC 18 hours a day, seven days a week. Because the LRC operation and JTF-AK support were additional duties, all of the Logistics Plans Division's normal work had to be postponed.⁴⁸

On 9 April, JTF-AK began coordinating the first requests for military support that it processed. The requests included airlift for a forklift needed in Kodiak, use of the Army and Air Force recreation camps at Seward for wildlife decontamination, and provision of four to five 200-bunk barges or ships to berth clean up crews.⁴⁹

JTF-AK processed two additional support requests on 11 April. Both were major. One, originated by JTF-AK itself, was for UH-60A (Blackhawk) helicopters to support Coast Guard and DOD assets deployed in Prince William Sound. The Blackhawks were to be used for search and rescue and medical evacuation. Although the FOSC specifically rejected the Blackhawks, the JTF staff regarded them as essential to provide adequate medical evacuation capability in the event of mass casualties in oil spill operations. The twin-engine helicopters had to come from Army assets at Fort Benning, Georgia, since Air Force Search and Rescue helicopters in Alaska could not be spared for oil spill work. Concurrent with this, two UH-1H (Iroquois) and two CH-47 (Chinook) helicopters deployed to Fort Richardson to backup the Blackhawks. The second major request, originated by the FOSC, was for a platform that could support on-going Coast Guard clean

⁴⁷ Hellesto, 3 Apr 90.

⁴⁸ Hellesto, 3 Apr 90.

⁴⁹ JTF-AK 001, 9 Apr 89.

up activity. The staff identified the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredge Yaquina at Portland, Oregon, as being the closest available vessel for the latter purpose.

The Logistics Readiness Center and deployed logistics staff also coordinated another significant action. This was the reception and unloading of an ammunition resupply barge at Valdez during the height of cleanup activity. Receipt of the barge was important to replenishment of Department of Defense munitions stocks in Alaska. Once the barge was unloaded, Exxon planned to use it to move material in support of the cleanup. The deployed logistics team developed and coordinated a receipt plan that involved night off-load of the barge during slack hours. The plan also included coordinated use of both the container and city docks at Valdez. The plan was coordinated with the logistics and senior staffs of Exxon, the Coast Guard, and JTF-AK. Major Greg Patz of the Military Traffic Management Command office at Elmendorf assured that the debarkation contractor met all required timelines. In fact, the off-load took only⁵⁰ six hours to complete instead of an estimated 12 hours.

When staff research revealed that commercial berthing ships were not available, Gen McInerney requested two LPD (Landing Platform Dock) or LSD (Landing Ship Dock) class naval vessels. The Navy ships were not only to shelter workers but also to provide command and control and logistic support for clean up operations. Support requested for the ships included two Naval Liaison Officers to augment the JTF staff, two CH-46 (Sea Knight) helicopters, three LCM-8 and as many LCM-6 landing craft as the Navy could locate and transport on the ships. The request for the ships specified that a Tactical Air Control Detachment should be embarked to manage flight operations to and from the vessels. In addition to requesting the Navy ships, Gen McInerney also asked that the Essayons, a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredge, also near Oregon, deploy to Alaska. The Essayons could team with the Yaquina in oil-skimming operations.⁵¹

Exxon, while enthusiastically receiving the benefits of military airlift for equipment it wanted, was more skeptical about other proffered military resources. There was no need said Exxon's man in charge, Otto R. Harrison, for the Corps of Engineers dredges Essayons and Yaquina. The current fleet of skimmers and natural

⁵⁰ Hellesto, 3 Apr 90.

⁵¹ JTF-AK 006, 14 Apr 89.

weathering were accomplishing a marked reduction in spilled oil in Prince William Sound. As for offshore oil, the Russian ship Vagdabgursky was enroute. He also asked for more information about the proposal to send two large Navy ships to house people and equipment.⁵²

While Exxon, the Coast Guard, and JTF-AK discussed the desirability of larger items and their availability, airlift continued.

**Airlift in Support of Oil Spill Operations
as of
11 April 89**

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Number of Missions</u>	<u>Cumulative Tonnage</u>
C-5	15	928
C-141	4	97
C-130	4	4
C-12	16	Passengers Only
Total	39	1029 tons

Table III-3⁵³

Much of the materiel airlift consisted of boom and booming supplies and 200 Lightweight Decontamination Apparatus (LDAs) sent to the spill.

Nine of the LDA units were in Alaska. Joint Task Force-Alaska requisitioned additional units through the Directorate of Military Support from Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve organizations throughout the United States. By 28 April, 100 LDAs had reached Valdez and more were enroute. Originally intended for decontamination after nuclear-biological-chemical warfare, the units were capable of generating pressurized streams of water heated up to 248 degrees Fahrenheit.⁵⁴ They could also operate as a cold water flush system.

⁵² Ltr, Harrison, Otto R. to Vice Adm Paul Yost, 10 Apr 89, SD 014.

⁵³ JTF-AK 010, 11 Apr 89.

⁵⁴ JTF-AK 010, 11 Apr 89, JTF-AK 004, 12 Apr 89, JTF-AK 020, 28 Apr 89.

MSgts Walter E Crawford, William A. Schneider, and SSgt Michael A. Burns, Disaster Preparedness Specialists from Elmendorf AFB, arrived at Valdez on 15 April with five LDAs. Then they went to Eleanor Island in Prince William Sound to test the units. SSgt Richard Picard, also from Elmendorf, followed on 23 April to unpack and service LDAs being shipped into Valdez. The LDAs proved highly effective in removing oil from contaminated beaches. They heated seawater into steam that drove oil from rocky beaches into the water where it could be collected by skimmers. After the test, the FOSC requested 150 additional LDAs for clean up work. They were made available to Exxon after an agreement had been worked out holding the government harmless for injuries or damage that might result from their use.⁵⁵

The surge of logistics requirements eventually required a total of 38 Air Force augmentees from outside Alaska to assist in-place staff. The Logistics Readiness Center operated from 25 April to 15 October 1989.⁵⁶

Medical

Private emergency medical technicians and nurses provided most medical care for civilian oil spill response workers. DOD medical survey teams went to Prince William Sound in May and June of 1989. The teams' observations resulted from requests by the Department of Labor and Alaska's senatorial delegation to Congress.⁵⁷

Col Richard A. Charlat, Director of Professional Services, Office of the AAC Surgeon, traveled to Prince William Sound with a small medical team for an initial evaluation on 18 May. He and Col Peter F. Hoffman, AAC Command Surgeon, made a second trip on 27 June. They found the personal protective clothing in use adequate,

⁵⁵ JTF-AK 008, 16 Apr 89, JTF-AK 009, 17 Apr 89, JTF-AK 014, 22 Apr 89.

⁵⁶ Redifer, Col Eric L., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, Hq JTF-AK, "Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Summary Report," 27 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

⁵⁷ Point Paper, Charlat, Col Richard A., USAF (MC), Director of Professional Services, Office of the Surgeon, AAC, "Medical Surveys of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Cleanup Operations," 21 Jul 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

except for a lack of protective goggles. This, they said, was the cause of the ten percent of medical complaints diagnosed as chemical conjunctivitis. With respect to other preventative measures, the AAC medical staff expressed concern about proper refrigeration of foods taken to the beach, warm water washing facilities on the beach, and fire hazards from smoking in berthing areas.⁵⁸

The lack of on-scene medical oversight by licensed physicians and lack of mass casualty evacuation capability for a workforce of thousands also concerned the military surgeons. Medical back-up for private emergency medical technicians and nurses was provided by shipboard DOD physicians and dentists who deployed with the clinic on Navy berthing vessels. The USAF Regional Hospital at Elmendorf maintained two 20-member Medical Rapid Response Forces on 24-hour alert for three months of the spill response activity for mass casualty coverage. It was not until the third month of spill response that Exxon provided a medical barge staffed with a physician in Prince William Sound.⁵⁹

The remoteness of spill operations and lack of surgical capability in Prince William Sound communities also created problems of medical support during Vice President Quayle's visit to the oil spill cleanup area. Because there was no surgical capability nearby, the Elmendorf hospital dispatched a surgical team to a Navy berthing vessel. The team consisted of an anesthesiologist, orthopedic surgeon, general surgeon, and operating room nurse and equipped with an anesthesia machine to stand-by during Mr. Quayle's trip.⁶⁰

Public Affairs

The oil spill generated high interest by national and statewide media plus sensitivity by local residents to accusations that the military might interfere with job opportunities. This made public affairs a particularly important part of DOD's oil spill response.

⁵⁸ Charlat, 21 Jul 89.

⁵⁹ Phonecall, Honorable w/Col Richard A. Charlat, USAF (MC), Director of Professional Services, Office of the Surgeon, AAC, 28 Mar 90.

⁶⁰ Col Charlat, 28 Mar 90.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs designated Lt Col Michael G. Conley, USAF, AAC Director of Public Affairs, as senior Defense representative on public affairs matters relating to the oil spill response. The AAC Public Affairs office then became responsible for coordinating DOD public affairs actions with the FOSC, determining public affairs assets available in Alaska augmentation requirements, and providing public affairs support to the DOD Assessment Team.⁶¹

Capt Aloisio, sent to Valdez earlier, remained until 17 April when replaced by Maj Sherell Mock, USA, from the 6th Infantry Division (Light). Lt Cdr Joe March, USN, of Naval Base Seattle, joined Mock at Valdez on 20 April. When the USS Juneau arrived, March embarked and coordinated media visits to the ship. SSgt Dave Haulbrook of the 21st TFW replaced Mock on 29 April. Naval Reserve Captain Ronald L. Toth replaced March on 14 May. When Capt Toth departed on 13 July, DOD public affairs activities were placed⁶² in the hands of the Federal Media Center in Valdez.

Protocol

The oil spill response also increased protocol activity. Of the 423 flag rank and civilian equivalent visitors to Alaska in 1989, about 25 percent were associated with the Prince William Sound Oil Spill. The oil spill visitors included Vice President Dan Quayle.⁶³

Vice President Quayle first visited the oil spill activity on 4 May 1989. He was returning to the United States after a trip to the Far East. His party arrived in Cordova at 1805 where they were met by Secretary of Transportation Skinner; Mr. Richard Breeden, Assistant to the President; Adm Yost; Gen McInerney; and Mayor Erling Johansen of Cordova. From Cordova, the party flew to the USS Juneau and changed into protective clothing. From the USS Juneau, the party went via Fishing Vessel

⁶¹ Conley, Lt Col Michael G., USAF, Director of Public Affairs, Hq AAC, "On-Scene Coordinator's Report for the T/S EXXON VALDEZ Oil Spill," 13 Sep 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

⁶² Conley, 13 Sep 89.

⁶³ Hist (S/Decl OADR), Hq AAC/ANR/JTF-AK, Jan 89-Dec 89 (Draft), info used is unclassified.

Rebecca to an oil-soaked beach. The Vice President spent about ten minutes on the beach. There he talked with cleanup workers and tested one of the hoses used to wash the oil off the beach. After returning to the USS Juneau, Vice President Quayle addressed the crew. Then the Vice Presidential party flew by helicopter to Elmendorf where he boarded his aircraft early on 5 May for the return flight to Washington, D.C.⁶⁴


The Vice President's second oil spill trip came in September 1989. Although President Bush had been scheduled to inspect the oil spill response, other priorities kept him from coming. Vice President Quayle, again traveling to the Far East, stopped at Elmendorf for two and a half hours on 18 September. Adm Yost and Gen McInerney greeted the Vice President and his party, which included Secretary Skinner. Then Mr. and Mrs. Quayle, Secretary Skinner, and several others were taken to JTF-AK headquarters for a briefing and meetings with local political leaders. Before leaving, Vice President Quayle reaffirmed the support of the Bush administration for the cleanup effort and that Exxon had promised they would complete the project.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Hist draft, January-December 1989.

⁶⁵ Hist draft, January-December 1989.



(left to right) Col Morton V. Plumb Jr., USAF; Vice Adm Clyde E. Robbins, USCG; Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF; Capt Carl Weegar, USN confer in Prince William Sound. (USAF Photo, April 1989)



Vice President Dan Quayle, Adm Paul A. Yost, Commandant, USCG, and Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF, Defense Senior Representative for the Oil Spill Cleanup Support, at press conference. (USAF Photo, May 1989)

Chapter IV
FIELD OPERATIONS
for
MILITARY SUPPORT

Airlift

Air Force C-5A Galaxy 77034 from Travis Air Force Base, CA, made the first Air Force flight in support of the oil spill response on 27 March, carrying over 159,000 pounds of cargo. C-5B 70041 followed on 30 March with three fenders, a communications van, and 11 pallets of miscellaneous equipment. Alaska Air National Guard C-130 Hercules flights⁶⁶ supplemented this strategic airlift from outside Alaska.

Airlift Support
as of
30 April 1989

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Number of Missions</u>	<u>Cumulative Tonnage</u>
C-5	17	992.3
C-141	4	97.0
C-130	4	4.0
C-12	30	Passengers
Total	50	1093.3

Table IV-1

Command, Control, and Communications

Sophisticated communications technology was among the most valuable military contributions to oil spill clean up management. The communications links extended both from the JTF-AK headquarters into the field and from the headquarters back to Washington, D.C.

⁶⁶ Ltr, Smith, L.J., Exxon Logistics Coordinator, Valdez, Alaska, to Federal On-Scene Coordinator, Prince William Sound, 17 Apr 89.

A communications team from Scott AFB, IL, arrived at Elmendorf early in April to establish a communications link between Adm Yost and Gen McInerney. About the same time, technicians installed a video-conferencing system so that Gen McInerney could communicate face-to-face with Washington officials.⁶⁷

According to Col Wilson, the video-conferencing system was "the single biggest thing that contributed to our [JTF-AK] ability to deal with it, and our having credibility in Washington. . . ." ⁶⁸ The Coast Guard, however, refused to accept the video-conferencing capability as a legitimate oil-spill response expense. ⁶⁹ The Guard's fiscal officer, Capt R.E. Anderson, told JTF repeatedly that the Coast Guard did not want the system. Even so, the Coast Guard later acknowledged that Gen McInerney had "used it very effectively regarding the DOMS request for a contingency plan." ⁷⁰

Communications with the huge flotillas of fishing boats that Exxon began to dispatch from ports such as Cordova, Valdez, Seward, Homer, and Kodiak created a major command, control, and communications problem. Variations in equipment and operator capability, and natural conditions unfavorable to transmission made coordination of the flotillas' work difficult.

To help with this problem, Alaskan Air Command offered a modified version of its Alaska Command and Control System Military Automated Network (AC2SMAN) system known as "OSCAR" (Oil Spill Computer Automated Response). OSCAR aided the Coast Guard and Exxon in communicating with and deploying the hundreds of aircraft and vessels responding to the oil spill. It also provided an electronic mail system and graphic display of the location and status of oil spill resources. Data could be entered into OSCAR from laptop computers in the field or from personal computers in administrative

⁶⁷ JTF-AK 005, 13 Apr 89.

⁶⁸ Wilson, 23 Jan 90.

⁶⁹ JTF-AK 046, 25 May 89.

⁷⁰ Memo, Capt R.E. Anderson, USCG, to Capt Zawadzki, USCG, "Cost Reimbursement to DOD," 9 May 89, SD 015.

offices. OSCAR ultimately was operational at Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Valdez, Juneau, and Washington, D.C.⁷¹

Early on, Washington offices of the Army's Corps of Engineers had begun to tout the usefulness of two Corps dredges, the Essayons and the Yaquina for spill recovery work. Col Kakel at first recommended against sending the dredges to Alaska. Then he changed his mind when he realized that they could serve as command and control platforms. Otto Harrison of Exxon also changed his mind. He wrote to Adm Robbins, the FOSC, requesting use of both the Essayons and the Yaquina, stating that Exxon was prepared to pay incremental costs for the ships. This was to cause some problems. Both dredges were "project funded," and no operating funds were available for their normal costs. Thus the Corps needed to be paid for the \$28,000 daily cost for the Yaquina and the \$61,000 daily cost for the Essayons.⁷²


Both ships had advanced communications gear and radar designed to track up to 100 ships when the dredges operated in busy harbors. Coincidentally, Kakel's headquarters in Anchorage had just installed a powerful high-frequency, single-sideband radio in its Emergency Operations Center that could be used to communicate with the vessels. The Alaska District then quickly obtained a computer terminal that could report the dredges' locations via OSCAR. As a result, the Alaska District was able to maintain contact with its dredges for all but two days of the time the dredges were deployed to the oil spill. This communications link fed a Corps' Crisis Management Team, which functioned mostly on a 24-hour-a-day basis from 6 April to 9 June.⁷³

⁷¹ Shepherd, Col John L., USAF, Director, C4I Programs, Hq AAC, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," 18 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

⁷² Ltr, Otto R. Harrison to Vice Adm Clyde Robbins, March 31, 1989; Memo, Capt R.E. Anderson, USCG, to FOSC Valdez, "COE Dredges," 26 Apr 89, SD 016; Kakel, 13 Feb 90.

⁷³ Kakel, 13 Feb 90; "Crisis management team directs oil spill response," p. 1; "Radio communications prove vital in emergency response," p. 8; "Computer programs link Corps to Joint Task Force information," p. 8; Espirit de Corps, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1990, p. 1, SD 017.

Once the Federal On-Scene Coordinator had requested the two vessels, the Yaquina arrived from Portland on 19 April and the Essayons from the same location on 21 April.



U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Dredge Essayons. Essayons and Yaquina turned out to be among the most effective devices for collecting oil. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Photo, 1989)

When the dredges arrived, they came under Col Kakel's operational control. He placed Corps of Engineers' officers aboard the dredges as mission commanders, with the vessel masters charged with assuring safe and efficient vessel operations. Kakel charged his mission commanders to be pro-active, seeking out missions rather than waiting to be called. Essayons and Yaquina were to set standards. As a result, the dredges served wherever they operated as command and control platforms for concentrations of fishing boats.⁷⁴

Reconnaissance

Locating the oil continued to be a problem. Although aerial infrared sensors could locate it, visual observation from aircraft or surface vessels was difficult. Floating beds of plankton bloom could be mistaken for oil by inexperienced scouts and the oil occasionally submerged several inches below the surface. One of the best means for visual observation turned out to be a helicopter operating from a surface vessel. When this was discovered, the FOSC⁷⁵ requested a UH-1 for four days to monitor oil movements.

Air Force photo reconnaissance units in Alaska for summer exercises also made passes over the oil and satellite imagery was attempted. Finally, all parties agreed to use infrared imagery from the Coast Guard's Aireye and Exxon flights as the "official" determination of the oil's location.

Collecting Oil

Recognition of the values that the Essayons and Yaquina offered for command, control, and communications, was soon matched by a desire to have them do something about the oil itself. As noted above, Navy skimmers were on-scene within a few days after the 24 March oil spill. They immediately ran into problems. Within a few days of the spill, much of the oil had weathered into a thick, peanut butter-like mousse. While the skimmers could

⁷⁴ Kakel, 13 Feb 90.

⁷⁵ Heaton, Capt Charles, USA (CE), Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Alaska Oil Spill - Lessons Learned, Inability to Locate Oil," undated, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated; JTF-AK 007, 15 Apr 89.

collect this material, it clogged their gear and was almost impossible to pump out of the skimmers' storage tanks.

A Mark I skimmer carried aboard the Yaquina met the same difficulties as had the Navy and Exxon skimmers. Likewise, attempts to suck up floating oil with the dredges' pumps and drag heads was unsuccessful. Pumps were too slow, and soon choked on the thick mousse and the debris trapped in it. The drag heads reached too deeply into the 10-inch-thick floating mousse. This caused them to acquire too high a volume of sea water in proportion to the mousse picked up.

Experimentation by the dredge crews resulted in a major breakthrough in skimming technique. Chief Mate Jimmy Holcroft of the Yaquina suggested inverting the drag heads, placing them just underneath the oil, and sucking the oil down into them. Within 15 minutes of the first trial of this method on 19 April, 63,000 gallons of oil had been deposited in the Yaquina's hoppers. Off-loading the collected oil, by this time of a consistency similar to wet concrete, then became a problem. This problem was eventually solved when the Corps of Engineers' ⁷⁶ crews were able to reverse the dredges' drag head pumps.

Preparations for serious off-shore skimming began around 21 April. The Essayons, in the vicinity of Port Dick to the southwest of Prince William Sound, began to fit out for skimming operations. The Soviet ship Vaydagbubsky, largest skimmer in the world, was south of Port Dick and also fitting out. The Russian ship adapted the new techniques developed by the Yaquina, but was never as ⁷⁷ successful because of differences in basic equipment.

During the next few days both ships collected oil offshore from the south coast of the Kenai Peninsula. They were frequently interrupted ⁷⁸ by bad weather and only recovered small amounts of oil.

⁷⁶ Edwards, Dawn M., Task Force Castle (Portland, OR: Public Affairs Office, North Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1989), p. 11, SD 018; Kakel, 13 Feb 90.

⁷⁷ JTF-AK 013, 21 Apr 89.

⁷⁸ JTF-AK 019, 27 Apr 89.

Measuring the amount of oil captured turned out to be yet another problem. As skimming operations progressed, interest soared in quantifying the amount of oil recovered. Measuring captured oil in hoppers using a "dipstick" technique similiar to measuring the oil in an automobile engine, dredge crews discovered that the oil was compacting and compressing out the water sucked up with the oil.

By 19 May, Col Kakel was recommending that the Essayons be released. Although the dredge had collected 1,680 barrels of oil between 23 and 26 April, she had collected only an additional 498 barrels between 26 April and 19 May. The Essayons was being used as a shore barge, accepting debris removed from beaches. The dredge itself was collecting no oil. The time was past, said Col Kakel, when use of the dredge was cost effective. Coast Guard authorities disagreed and Essayons remained on oil spill duty.⁸⁰

The Yaquina, too, was ready to move on. Once her hoppers had been off-loaded to an Exxon sludge barge, the FOSC released the smaller dredge.⁸¹ Release for the Essayons came on 31 May.

When the Coast Guard released the dredges, clean up had to be faced. Environmentalists in the dredges' homeport state of Oregon had already been aroused by tentative plans to take the Exxon Valdez there for repairs. The Corps wanted the ships spotless before they entered Oregon's Columbia River. Both ships moved to Seward. Clean up crews hired by Exxon found that the sludge in the hoppers had hardened to an asphalt-like state. At the same time, organic material --carcasses, vegetation, etc.-- trapped in the sludge were decaying and producing poisonous and hazardous gasses. For the Essayons the problem was particularly difficult. While operating in Shelikof Strait, the larger dredge had accepted debris from strait beaches that added to the unmanageable properties of the sludge. The Yaquina was able to sail for Portland after 12 days of scrubbing, but


⁷⁹ Kakel, 13 Feb 90.

⁸⁰ Memo, Col William W. Kakel, USA (CE), "Recommendation to disengage Dredge Essayons," 19 May 89; Memo, Capt J.L. Crowe Jr., USCG, "Relief of ACOE Dredge Essayons," 19 May 89.

⁸¹ JTF-AK 047, 26 May 89, JTF-AK 050, 31 May 89.

the Essayons, after arriving at Seward on 1 June, was able to leave only on 17 July.⁸²

Skimming Configuration



U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' developed technique for using dredges to skim oil. (Drawing courtesy of Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

⁸² Kakel, 13 Feb 90; "Oil Easier to pump in than scrape out," p. 1, and Edwards, Dawn, "Innovations turn dredges into successful oil skimmers," in Esprit de Corps, Oil Spill Special Edition, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1990, p. 4.

In all, the two Corps of Engineers dredges had collected a total of nearly 300,000 gallons of spilled oil. The Essayons did so at a cost of \$195,768 and the Yaguina at a cost of \$145,685, with labor not included.⁸³

Ship-borne berthing

As Col Wilson and his JTF-AK planners turned their attention from oil collection to shoreline clean up, they saw a need to have berthing platforms for clean up workers. The anticipated thousands of beach clean up workers could not be accommodated in Valdez. Even if they could, transporting them to beaches 30 miles or more from Valdez would waste time and other resources. The workers needed to be based near the locations to be cleaned up. Doing this would also narrow the span of control for Exxon, so⁸⁴ that all work did not have to be directed from Valdez.

Initial considerations included use of Navy berthing barges. Research revealed that the only suitable Navy barge was needed at San Diego for the crew of a ship undergoing overhaul. Other Navy berthing barges were gutted and unsuitable. Troopships were not a consideration because the only such ships were in mothballs. This left Navy amphibious assault ships as the most likely type of "floating hotel" that the Department of Defense could provide. The nearest were in the Navy's Amphibious Group Three (PHIBGRU THREE) at San Diego.⁸⁵

Once the decision was made to send amphibious assault ships to serve as floating hotels, considerations were: where to place ships, which ships were to be sent, and how long the ships sent should remain on station. The solutions to these considerations had to balance oil spill clean up⁸⁶ needs, Navy needs, and readiness considerations.

⁸³ "Corps spends \$529,669 to cleanup oil spill," in Esprit de Corps, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1990, p. 6.

⁸⁴ Wilson, 23 Jan 90.

⁸⁵ Intvw, Hanable w/CDR John A. Tobia, USN, CINCPAC Liaison Officer to ALCOM, 25 Jan 90, SD 019.

⁸⁶ Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

Cdr John A. Tobia, United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) Naval Liaison Officer to AAC, and Capt Robert Ianucci, Chief of Staff for the Commander, PHIBGRU THREE, traveled to Valdez in early April and met with city and Exxon officials regarding placement of ships. Dockside services in city were inadequate, and city officials indicated that large numbers of sailors on shore on liberty would be disruptive in Valdez's emergency situation. Also, placing ships in Valdez would mean that accommodated workers would have to commute to area of clean up operations. These problems led to a decision ⁸⁷ to anchor the ships near the clean up locations.


Of available amphibious ships, USS Juneau was most suitable from a scheduling standpoint. Nearly 600 feet in length, the USS Juneau has a normal crew complement of 457 and can embark 840 troops. It was known that any ship used would have severe impact on planned operations. There were also readiness issues. Concurrent with the oil spill, world events such as the Panama crisis influenced deployment decisions. Ship cycling schedules were also important. Navy policy is that ships deployed for 50-plus days will not be redeployed for 12 months. Assignment of ships to oil spill duties for extended periods could have had ripple effects for years on PHIBGRU THREE operations. ⁸⁸

Finding a second ship was even more difficult than finding the first. USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) had just come off 6-month deployment. Smaller than the USS Juneau, the USS Fort McHenry is over 600 feet long but displaces only 15,726 tons and can accommodate only 500 troops. As authorities debated whether one or two ships were needed, USS Fort McHenry deployments to Prince William Sound were announced and cancelled several times. This had an immediate impact on crew morale and long-term impact on planned training, etc. ⁸⁹


⁸⁷ Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

⁸⁸ Msg, CINCPACFLT, Pearl Harbor, HI, to JTF-AK, Elmendorf AFB, AK, "Alaska Oil Spill Public Affairs Guidance," 161753Z Apr 89; Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

⁸⁹ CINCPACFLT, 161753Z Apr 89; Tobia, 25 Jan 90.



USS Juneau, one of a series of Navy amphibious assault ships sent to Prince William Sound to serve as command and control platforms and berthing ships for cleanup workers. A decontamination barge is tied alongside, as are a landing craft and a contracted vessel use to move oil spill workers. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Photo)



Cleanup workers on the beach. After a shift on the beach, the oil-soaked workers returned to the berthing ships after showering and changing clothes on decontamination barges. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Photo)

The formal request from Exxon for two amphibious assault ships and their landing craft to support oil spill clean up went forward on 14 April 1989. "High level" review of the proposed deployment resulted in dispatch of only USS Juneau, commanded by Capt T.A. Willandt, USN. Four days later, the USS Juneau departed San Diego enroute to Prince William Sound. In addition to its own crew and normally assigned small boats, the ship carried two U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 helicopters from Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California; two LCM-8s, each with a crew of five; six LCM-6s, each capable of lifting 34 tons or 80 troops; and five Dracon bladders. By 28 April, USS Juneau was anchored 1400 yards north of Smith Island (60-32.5N/147-22.2W) in Prince William Sound with 466 Exxon personnel embarked. The following day, the Blackhawk helicopters began conducting deck landing qualifications.⁹⁰

One day's work illustrated the enormity and difficulty of the work to be done. When weather permitted full crews to be placed on beaches, the USS Juneau reported that 1470 gallons of oil washed off the beaches had been collected by skimmer. Another 338 gallons of oil had been soaked up by individuals wiping rocks. Overall, on 29 April, 310 civilians hired by Exxon cleaned a 400-foot by 60-foot area. After they had worked all day, the estimate was that the area was about 30 percent clean.⁹¹

Air operations were almost continuous from the deck of the USS Juneau and the amphibious ships that succeeded her in Prince William Sound. Regular flight operations for CH-46s making administrative and logistical runs from one ship to another and to Valdez and Anchorage occurred four to six times daily. Visitors arriving by helicopter, civilian helicopters making refueling stops, and medical evacuation flights added to the bustle.⁹²

⁹⁰ CINCPACFLT, 161753Z Apr 89; Msg, DOMS JTF, Washington, D.C., to JTF-AK, Elmendorf AFB, AK, "Alaska Oil Spill Assistance," 180300Z Apr 89; JTF-AK 011, 19 Apr 89; JTF-AK 020, 28 Apr 89; JTF-AK 021, 29 Apr 89.

⁹¹ JTF-AK 022, 30 Apr 89.

⁹²7 Msg, USS Fort McHenry, to COMPHIBGRU THREE, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," No DTG, 5 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

On 27 April, the JTF learned that the Secretary of Defense had approved use of the USS Fort McHenry and that the Commandant of the Coast Guard had authorized the FOSC to request use of the second ship. Coordination between JTF-AK, the FOSC, and COMPHIBGRU THREE resulted in a load-out that included 6 LCM-6s, 4 LCM-8s, 1 CH-46, and all personnel needed to support the boats. The LSD also carried her own boats and 2,000 feet of boom.⁹³

The USS Fort McHenry, commanded by Cdr G.S. Rhodes, USN, sailed north on 28 April. She arrived in Prince William Sound on the morning of 4 May. There she joined the USS Juneau off Smith Island. She remained within signalling distance of the USS Juneau for the duration of Vice President Quayle's visit to the oil spill scene. When the Vice Presidential visit was completed, the USS Fort McHenry got underway for Valdez where she would embark 320 Exxon/VECO workers. When the workers were aboard, the USS Fort McHenry steamed to Green Island (60-19N/147-21W) to begin cleanup operations. After ship orientation for the civilian workers, the LCMs carried civilian workers based on the USS Fort McHenry to their first day of beach cleanup on 9 May.⁹⁴

After the USS Juneau and then USS Fort McHenry were ordered to Alaska, there were several key aspects of operations. These included liaison functions, relocations, changeovers, civilian-military relations, and crew training and morale.

Each ship sent two liaison officers to JTF-AK to work with the CAT. The liaison officers provided expertise on air operations, communications, logistics, and other naval activities for the JTF/CAT staff which consisted primarily of Air Force and Army officers. In the long-term, the oil spill activity provided interoperability experience both for the JTF/CAT staff and for the liaison officers⁹⁵, typically O-2s, O-3s, and senior enlisted personnel.

⁹³ Msg, COMDT COGARD, Washington, D.C., to FOSC, Valdez, AK, "Use of Add DOD Forces Valdez Spill," 241847Z Apr 89, SD 020; JTF-AK 019, 27 Apr 89.

⁹⁴ JTF-AK, 017, 25 Apr 89; JTF-AK 019, 27 Apr 89; JTF-AK 026, 4 May 89; JTF-AK 027, 5 May 89; JTF-AK 028, 6 May 89; JTF-AK 029, 8 May 89, JTF-AK 031, 9 May 89.

⁹⁵ Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

Periodically, the ships relocated as the beach working areas changed. This presented problems since Prince William Sound had not been recharted after 1964. That year an undersea earthquake caused significant disturbance to the ocean floor and made many of the existing charts unreliable. As a result, the Navy ships either relied on a NOAA hydrographic ship or small boats with fathometers to clear passages to new anchorages.⁹⁶

Once the decision was made to rotate ships, COMJTF, FOSC, and Exxon all desired that the turnovers be made with no interruption of clean up work. This was accomplished by having the civilian work crews take all their gear with them as they departed for work on the turnover day. The gear was stored on the barges tied alongside the departing ship. After the workers left, the barges were untied, the new ship replaced the departing ship, and the barges were tied up to the new ship. At the end of the day, the workers returned, retrieved their gear from the barges where it had been stored, and the turnover was completed with no loss of work hours.⁹⁷

Using this system, USS Cleveland relieved USS Juneau on 31 May 1989 and USS Mount Vernon relieved USS Fort McHenry on 9 June 1989. Then on 10 July, USS Ogden relieved the Cleveland. The USS Mount Vernon departed without relief on 18 July, leaving behind eight landing craft which were to be leased to Exxon. Working out the lease agreement took a lot of work. The condition of the landing craft had not been ascertained before they started on oil spill operations. Nor did the Navy have any experience in drawing up similar leases. When the difficulties were finally resolved, Exxon and the Navy signed a lease agreement on 28 July 1989. The agreement leased 16 Navy LCMs and a sewerage barge to Exxon. Exxon agreed to recondition and return the landing craft

⁹⁶ Navgram, USS Fort McHenry to COMPHIBGRU THREE, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," 5 Oct 89; Navgram, USS Duluth to COMPHIBGRU THREE, "Alaska Oil Spill After-Action Report," 5 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

⁹⁷ Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

and barge to the Navy in San Diego when the cleanup work was completed.⁹⁸

Leasing of the landing craft anticipated departure of the last Navy ship. This was something DOD had been seeking since late May. Concern over the exposed nature of the shoreline to be cleaned led, however, Exxon and the FOSC to request that the USS Ogden remain in Prince William Sound until 15 September. Concerned about operational schedules and crew morale, the Navy instead sent USS Duluth to relieve the USS Ogden on 16 August 1989. The USS Duluth stayed until 16 September 1989.⁹⁹

"Hotel" duty was difficult for the ships. It precluded much crew training, some of which anticipated major evaluations scheduled in the near future, USS Juneau, for instance, faced an engineering evaluation only two months after her scheduled return date from Alaska. The crews had to adjust to strange duties, at anchor in isolated locations. Accommodating large numbers of mixed-gender crews of civilians, themselves engaged in dirty, tiring work, required difficult adjustments by the ships' crews. Plumbing problems, etc., resulted from the civilians' unfamiliarity with ships' systems. An initial attempt to run separate messing facilities with one for civilians catered by a civilian contractor and one for crew with Navy cooks quickly gave way to civilian contractors and Navy cooks offering integrated messing. Suprisingly, given the opportunities for difficulty, there were ¹⁰⁰ major conflicts between the civilians and military.

Adm Baker asked that, because of the stressful duty, every effort be made to arrange liberty for ships' crews. Anchorage was the nearest suitable liberty port. The embarked U.S. Marine Corps CH-46s airlifted liberty parties of 18 three times a week. The parties traveled by helicopter over three routes. They sometimes went directly to Anchorage by helicopter. When weather blocked Portage Pass, the preferred helicopter route to Anchorage, the parties traveled to Cordova or Valdez where they could be transferred to USAF fixed-wing

⁹⁸ JTF-AK 051, 1 Jun 89; JTF-AK 058, 9 Jun 89; JTF-AK 075, 10 Jul 89; JTF-AK 078, 20 Jul 89; JTF-AK 080, 1 Aug 89.

⁹⁹ JTF-AK 081, 8 Aug 89; JTF-AK 082, 15 Aug 89; JTF-AK 087, 19 Sep 89.

¹⁰⁰ USS Cleveland, 042100Z Oct 89; Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

aircraft for flights to Anchorage. At other times, the helicopters flew to Seward where the liberty parties could take Air Force or Army buses to Anchorage. A senior petty officer was detailed to Anchorage to serve as liberty coordinator. CDR Tobia assisted with all aspects of the coordination including billeting, transportation, a Host-a-Sailor program through the Armed Services YMCA in Anchorage, Chamber of Commerce discounts, etc., for the liberty parties.¹⁰¹


Command structure was also an issue. Gen McInerney desired a Navy flag officer on scene in Prince William Sound as his Alaska Oil Spill Task Force deputy commander. While RADM Baker was assigned this duty, his other responsibilities as commander of PHIBGRU THREE with 33 other ships and 22,000 personnel made it impossible for him to stay on-scene for protracted periods. He was able to travel to the Elmendorf headquarters and Prince William Sound¹⁰² four times, but was unable to remain continuously.

Other civilian landing craft leased by Exxon and those brought by the amphibious assault ships proved very useful. The FOSC asked for others if DOD could locate them. As a result, arrangements were made to "rent" various types of craft from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Army Reserve units in California provided four LCUs (Landing Craft Utility) that arrived in Alaska on 1 June. Guard units in Alaska and Washington provided additional landing craft. Eight LCMs came from the Washington National Guard and four LCUs from the Alaska National Guard.¹⁰³

101 Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

102 Tobia, 25 Jan 90.

103 JTF-AK 054, 5 Jun 89.



Above - Alaskan Air Command Disaster Preparedness specialists MSgt Walter Crawford, MSgt William A. Schneider, and SSgt Michael A. Burns explain the Lightweight Decontamination Apparatus to Vice Adm Clyde E. Robbins, USCG, Federal On-Scene Coordinator. Below - the Lightweight Decontamination Apparatus is demonstrated. (USAF Photo)



Medical Evacuation Support

As soon as it was clear that large numbers of military personnel might be deployed to Prince William Sound, JTF-AK planners recognized the need for medical evacuation support. A staff review indicated that the three HH-3 helicopters assigned to the 71st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron at Elmendorf would probably not be available for oil spill work. Only two of the four HH-3s were operational, the 71st crews were behind on training sorties, and the available HH-3s were scheduled to support North Warning System tests at Barter Island in June.¹⁰⁴

Since the HH-3s were not available, the task force requested three Army UH-60A helicopters for medical evacuation work. Originally it was thought the UH-60As could be based at Bryant Army Airfield at Fort Richardson. The aircraft were to perform medevac/mass casualty operations if requested by the FOSC, and 6th ID(L), JTF-AK, and the FOSC worked out an emergency medevac/SAR notification system. AAC provided two para-rescue personnel to support the helicopters, which came from the 498th Medical Company at Fort Benning, Georgia.¹⁰⁵

Once they arrived, two of the UH-60A Blackhawks deployed to Seward and a third to the USS Juneau. As procedures evolved, the helicopters deployed to the ships rotated back to Seward every five days. By 1 May, all of the Blackhawk pilots had qualified for deck landings.¹⁰⁶

On 4 May, a civilian patient was evacuated to the USS Juneau. A civilian helicopter received emergency landing authorization to deliver a patient whom the ship's doctor treated for chemical conjunctivitis.¹⁰⁷ The first medevac from USS Juneau came on 9 May when the embarked CH-46 helicopter took a 65-year-old from the fishing vessel Nunatic to the Valdez hospital following

¹⁰⁴ Talking Paper, Maj Conway, "HH-3 Support," 14 Apr 89, SD 021.

¹⁰⁵ JTF-AK 006, 14 Apr 89; JTF-AK 009, 17 Apr 89; JTF_AK 018, 26 Apr 89.

¹⁰⁶ JTF-AK 023, 1 May 89.

¹⁰⁷ JTF-AK 027, 5 May 89.

an angina attack.¹⁰⁸ The most potentially serious injury came on 21 May, when another embarked CH-46 took a 31-year-old male beach worker to Valdez hospital. Although a spinal fracture was suspected, it turned out that the patient had only a badly sprained back and would fully recover.¹⁰⁹

June 10 was the busiest day for medevacs. A small civilian aircraft crashed on the north side of Knight Island. An Exxon boat recovered the two occupants, a male and a female, and took them to a Coast Guard cutter. The cutter subsequently transferred them to the USS Cleveland, where the ship's doctor examined the couple. The female had a broken nose, sprained wrist and neck, and minor lacerations. The male had no visible injuries. The UH-60A embarked on the Cleveland took the couple to the Valdez hospital. The helicopter also took a civilian worker suffering internal bleeding from the Exxon barge Greencreek to Humana Hospital in Anchorage.¹¹⁰ In another incident on the same day, a female civilian worker fell on a barge, struck her head, and became unconscious. The USS Mount Vernon's embarked UH-60A took her to Providence Hospital in Anchorage.¹¹¹

A month after the three medevacs in June, there were two more same-day incidents. On 10 July UH-60As took two people to Anchorage hospitals. The first was a civilian who fell down a hill and lacerated her wrist with arterial damage. The second was a crew member who suffered first and second-degree burns to 25 percent of his body.¹¹²

Later in July, there were more medevac missions. On 22 July, a petty officer from USS Ogden was flown to Seward and then to Elmendorf AFB. A preliminary diagnosis of appendicitis turned out to be severe gastritis. On 24 July, a civilian was injured in the collision of two civilian vessels. After being treated for broken ribs by a Navy doctor, the patient was taken

108 JTF-AK 031, 9 May 89.

109 JTF-AK 042, 21 May 89.

110 JTF-AK 059, 11 Jun 89.

111 JTF-AK 060, 12 Jun 89.

112 JTF-AK 075, 10 Jul 89.

by the USCG Cutter Resolute to Valdez for medevac by a commercial aircraft.¹¹³

Early in August the medevac helicopters were needed again. On 7 August, one of the UH-60As took an Exxon worker aboard USS Ogden to a civilian hospital in Anchorage. The worker had suffered a back injury. Then on 9 August, a UH-60A supported a Coast Guard mission to transport USCG Marine Safety personnel to inspect an oil spill from a barge in Prince William Sound.¹¹⁴ Later in August, the medevac helicopter took a crew member from USCG Resolute to USS Duluth for treatment of a fractured hand. Later, a female civilian worker was taken from the barge Resurrection Bay to Valdez because of a possible miscarriage. When Exxon reported a male overboard from its tug boat Ensco Giant, a Marine CH-46 searched for him without success.¹¹⁵

A Marine CH-46 and an Army UH-60A rescued two more downed flyers on 29 August. The CH-46, enroute to Elmendorf AFB, spotted a downed, fixed-wing civilian aircraft and two airmen in the vicinity of Cape Puget.

A Blackhawk with an Army pilot and crew supplemented by an Air Force para-rescue jumper embarked on USS Duluth picked up the two men and took them back to the ship. After they had remained aboard overnight, a UH-60A took them on to Anchorage.¹¹⁶

When the USS Duluth left Prince William Sound on 16 September, she took the Marine CH-46s with her. The Army UH-60As flew to Elmendorf Air Force Base to be prepared for airlift to their home station in Georgia. A Military Airlift Command C-5 took them there on 22 September.¹¹⁷ It was time for an end of season accounting.

113 JTF-AK 079, 25 Jul 89.

114 JTF-AK 082, 15 Aug 89.

115 JTF-AK 083, 22 Aug 89.

116 Msg, USS Duluth, "Proposed Press Release," 300230Z Aug 89; JTF-AK 085, 5 Sep 89.

117 JTF-AK 087, 19 Sep 89.

Chapter V

PERSPECTIVES

End of Season Accounting

In mid-September, at the end of the first season's field operations to cleanup the 11 million gallons of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez, the Department of Defense concluded that it had spent a total of over \$58 million to support cleanup efforts. Of this, the department categorized \$18 million as "obligated or collected."

DOD Cost Summary as of 14 September 1989

Component	Dollar Value Orders Rcvd	Dollar Value Total Effort	Amounts Oblig/Coll'd
Navy			
Skimmer Ops	7,471,000	7,256,000	7,256,000
Skimmer Rent	6,271,000	10,035,763	6,271,000
Amphib Ships	-0-	20,489,000	-0-
Landing Craft	760,000	371,256	760,000
Army			
Dredges Rent	-0-	10,963,031	-0-
Helos Medevac	-0-	1,911,000	-0-
Helos Spotting	-0-	1,102,561	485,997
Liaison/Admin	-0-	428,234	-0-
Air Force			
AAC	-0-	1,460,777	92,590
MAC	3,800,000	3,648,871	3,450,637
Misc Orgn	-0-	156,869	-0-
Liaison/Admin	-0-	871,743	-0-
Grand Total	18,302,000	58,685,105	18,316,224

Table V-1¹¹⁸

These cost figures represented a substantial investment of DOD resources. DOD military and civilian personnel, drawn from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, had reached a high of 1,413 on 12 June. On the average, 787 DOD personnel were assigned to the

¹¹⁸ JTF-AK 087, 19 Sep 89.

cleanup each day between April and September. These personnel performed a variety of functions and operated a variety of equipment. ¹¹⁹

Military Airlift Command (MAC) had flown 156 missions in support of the oil spill clean up. MAC's aircraft moved a total of 1,136.5 short tons of cargo. The Navy's Amphibious Group Three had provided six amphibious assault ships, each for approximately 40 days, as command and control platforms and berthing vessels. The Naval Sea Systems Command had provided 22 skimmers to collect floating oil. The Army Corps of Engineers had provided two dredges. These served both as command and control platforms and as innovative oil collectors. The Navy, the Army Reserve, and Army National Guard collectively had provided 30 landing craft to transport workers to beaches and for in-shore cleanup work. The Army and Marine Corps collectively had provided seven helicopters. Active and Reserve forces provided 251 decontamination units to wash oil from the beaches. Satellite communication radios, laptop computers, inflatable craft, a sewerage barge, and a C3 computer system were also made available. ¹²⁰

Lessons Learned

Planning. Contingency planning for military assistance to civil authorities was adequate. JTF-AK mobilization and support procedures were tested in the Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup. Although an on-shore incident or disaster was anticipated in OPLAN 9639-83, its provisions were readily adaptable to an on-water incident.

Staff Operations. After action analysis revealed several aspects of the Alaskan Oil Spill Clean Up that should be considered in similar incidents in the future. Some had to do with employment of assets and others had to do with administrative procedures.

Two had to do with the employment of large ships. First, rapid and contradictory decisions by resource users about the need or lack of need for follow-on ships

¹¹⁹ Rpt, Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²⁰ Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

played havoc with Amphibious Group Three planning. It became clear that in future situations, users of DOD assets had to accomplish proper employment planning and understand the impact of change. Second, the long-term (more than three-day) employment of large ships in inshore waters requires arrangements for off-loading of sewage. Such arrangements need to be made at the same time the need for the ships is determined.

Staff responding to the spill also had to develop some innovative administrative procedures which should be retained as part of DOD's institutional memory. As the support for the spill response evolved, a need to lease DOD assets occurred. Procedures for doing so had to be developed. Difficulties arose because some assets had not been surveyed prior to commitment to oil spill response.¹²¹

Augmentees were needed to support almost every aspect of JTF-AK support for the oil spill cleanup. Before they arrived, day-to-day staff operations of the Alaskan Command and the Alaskan NORAD Region in several areas ground to a halt. The oil spill experience indicated that augmentees should be mobilized as soon as JTF-AK is activated.¹²²

It is also clear from the combined after action reports that special emphasis should have been placed on making the oil spill clean up chain-of-command clear to DOD participants. While all managed to deal with it, some seem to have found it burdensome. A need was also expressed for on-the-ground DOD liaison in Valdez.¹²³

Field Operations. The innovative use of Corps of Engineers dredges to collect floating oil allowed the dredges to remove a great deal of oil. Their effectiveness was so great that arrangements should be

¹²¹ Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²² Rpt, Redifer, Lt Col Eric L., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, Hq JTF-AK, "Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Summary Report," 27 Oct 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²³ USS Cleveland, 042100Z Oct 89; 498th Medical Company, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated; Department of the Army, U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska, undated, incl in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

made for similar use of dredges in future oil spill incidents. The Alaska Oil Spill Clean Up, however, also showed that the dredges themselves should not be used to store collected oil. It should instead be pumped immediately from the dredges to containment barges.¹²⁴

The operations also showed that the dredges needed spotter aircraft to locate the oil for them, and that the dredges and aircraft needed compatible communications equipment.¹²⁵

Another lesson resulted from heavy use of landing craft assigned or attached to the large ships. The ships' crews, normally assigned duty as boat crews in addition to their ship-board duties, were soon overworked. The oil spill clean up experience indicated that dedicated boat crews should have been embarked and the ships' crews relieved of boat duty. One ship found that a minimum of nine fully-trained three-person crews were needed. The heavy use of the boats also would have made the presence of a boat maintenance detachment advantageous.¹²⁶

Embarked helicopter operations on the Navy ships were successful due to the dedication and professionalism of the Army and Marine aircrews. The oil spill operations did reveal a need to assure that maintenance personnel accompany all helicopters, and that the helicopters be equipped and the crews trained for over-water operations.¹²⁷

Conclusion

Overall, military support for the Alaska Oil Spill Cleanup was beneficial but costly. The clean up effort benefited because the military brought with it the

¹²⁴ Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²⁵ Rpt, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska, "Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Clean-Up Executive Summary," in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²⁶ USS Cleveland, 042100Z Oct 89; Msg, ACU One, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," 290115Z Sep 89, in Hq ALCOM, "Alaska Oil Spill After Action Report," undated.

¹²⁷ USS Duluth, 5 Oct 89.

ability to analyze, react, and put resources in place quickly. This was the principal military contribution.

The military also contributed unique resources such as airlift capability; berthing ships; command, control, and communications equipment and systems; decontamination apparatus, landing craft, medical evacuation equipment and skills; reconnaissance means; and skimming equipment, including the dredges. While some of these were available from civilian sources, they were not always obtainable in the quantities and timeframes required. Thus these DOD resources met needs that could not be satisfied elsewhere.

In the long-term, the military received in return the opportunity to identify lessons learned and prepare to apply them in future military assistance to civil authorities.



The Alaska Army National Guard's Skycrane (CH-54), shown here at the Valdez airport, provided some of the first military support for oil spill cleanup efforts. (USAF Photo, April 1989)



"Blackhawk" (UH-60A) helicopters from the U.S. Army's 498th Medical Company deployed to Seward and aboard Navy ships to support oil spill cleanup. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Photo)

CHRONOLOGY

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
24 Mar 89	T/V <u>Exxon Valdez</u> runs aground.
25 Mar 89	Maj Gen Schaeffer, Adj Gen, State of AK, surveys oil spill area. AK NG, Navy Supervisor of Salvage begin supporting spill response.
27 Mar 89	MAC makes its first oil spill response airlift flight.
28 Mar 89	AK NG establishes Air Coordination and Control Center at Valdez airport.
06 Apr 89	President Bush directs military to expand assistance in spill cleanup. Secretary of the Army designated as DOD executive agent for cleanup work. Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) activated in D.C. to coordinate DOD response. Lt Gen McInerney designated Defense Senior Representative for oil spill cleanup, makes initial assessment visit to oil spill cleanup area. JTF-Alaska Oil Spill (JTF-AOS) activated to coordinate DOD response in Alaska with Lt Gen McInerney as commander. Coast Guard Commandant Paul A. Yost placed in

charge of federal spill response, Vice Adm Clyde E. Robbins, USCG, named Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC)

07 Apr 89 USAF U-2s do photo reconnaissance of oil spill area.

09 Apr 89 JTF-AOS begins processing requests for military support for cleanup.

10 Apr 89 DOD Assessment Team makes first of several visits to oil spill area.

11 Apr 89 Dredge Yaquina ordered to support cleanup.

12 Apr 89 Medevac helicopters from Ft Benning, Georgia, ordered to support cleanup.

13 Apr 89 Dredge Essayons ordered to support cleanup.

14 Apr 89 Navy amphibious ships USS Juneau and USS Ft McHenry ordered to support cleanup.

15 Apr 89 First LDAs delivered to Valdez and tested.

Army deploys two UH-1 and 2 CH-47 helicopters to Ft Richardson to support cleanup.

17 Apr 89 First of several military PAOs sent to Valdez.

RADM E.B. Baker designated Deputy Commander, JTF-AOS.

19 Apr 89 Dredge Yaquina arrives for oil spill support.

Dredge skimming technique developed.

Medevac helicopters airlifted from Ft Benning, GA, to Elmendorf AFB.

21 Apr 89 Dredge Essayons arrives for oil spill support.

22 Apr 89 USCG requests second USN ship.

24 Apr 89 NCA direct JTF-AOS to prepare contingency plan for full military takeover of cleanup activity.

RADM E.B. Baker Jr., USN, reports as Deputy Commander, JTF-AOS

USS Juneau, first Navy berthing ship assigned, arrives oil spill cleanup area with nine landing craft.

All augmentees for JTF-AOS staff in place.

25 Apr 89 Joint Movement Center and Logistics Readiness Center set up to coordinate logistics operations.

28 Apr 89 Contingency plan completed, submitted to National Command Authorities.

Secretary of Defense approves use of second USN ship.

03 May 89 Medevac helicopters from 498 Med Co., USA, Fort Benning, GA, deploy to Seward.

04 May 89 USS Ft McHenry, second Navy berthing ship assigned, arrives oil spill cleanup area with 10 landing craft.

Vice President Quayle visits oil spill cleanup area.

07 May 89 Last of 251 LDAs delivered to Alaska.

11 May 89 Army medevac helicopters begin shipboard operations.

18 May 89 USAF medical team surveys oil spill cleanup area.

19 May 89 USACOE dredges released from oil spill duties.

31 May 89 USS Cleveland relieves USS Juneau.

01 Jun 89 Four landing craft from Army Reserve in California arrive oil spill cleanup area.

04 Jun 89 Eight landing craft from Washington Army National Guard arrive oil spill cleanup area.

08 Jun 89 Yaquina departs Alaskan waters.

09 Jun 89 USS Mt Vernon relieves USS Ft McHenry.

Three landing craft from Alaska Army National Guard arrive oil spill cleanup area.

12 Jun 89 DOD involvement with oil spill reaches high of 1,413 personnel.

10 Jul 89 USS Ogden relieves USS Cleveland.

18 Jul 89 USS Mt Vernon departs without relief.

19 Jul 89 Essayons departs Alaskan waters.

28 Jul 89 US Navy executes lease agreement with Exxon for 16 LCMs and sewerage barge.

16 Aug 89 USS Duluth relieves USS Ogden.

06 Sep 89 All military LDAs shipped by Exxon for reconditioning.

15 Sep 89 All cleanup operations in oil spill area stop.

16 Sep 89 USS Duluth departs without relief.

18 Sep 89 Vice President Quayle visits Elmendorf AFB for oil spill briefing.

19 Sep 89 JTF-AOS deactivates.

22 Sep 89 Medevac helicopters airlifted to Fort Benning.

 Navy sewerage barge departs Valdez for San Diego.

28 Sep 89 DOMS-TF deactivates.

01 Oct 89 All leased landing craft shipped by Exxon for reconditioning.

08 Oct 89 All Navy skimmers and associated equipment shipped to depots.

15 Oct 89

Logistics Readiness
Center disestablished.

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Detailed lists of references follow. Those identified as "Source Documents" are attached to the depository copy of this study filed with the United States Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6678 (telephone: Autovon 875-5342; Commercial 205-293-5342). The study and copies of the source documents on microfilm may be purchased from the Research Center.

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
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Dredge Yaquina. Chief Mate Jimmy Holcroft of the Yaquina developed the technique for using the drag heads of dredges to suck oil up from beneath the ocean's surface. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Photo)

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